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New characterizations for largeness of the core
Arantza Este´vez-Ferna´ndeza
Abstract:
In this paper we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization of largeness
of the core is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization
shows the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements
of the games that are obtained from the original one by increasing the value of the grand coalition. The third
characterization of largeness of the core is based on the idea that if a base of the grand coalition does not provide
a core element of the game, it should not provide a core element of a game which differs from the original one only
by an increase of the value of the grand coalition. Based on these new characterizations, we show the equivalence
between largeness of the core and stability of the core for games with at most 5 players and we revise some results
on the literature concerning largeness of the core.
Keywords: core, upper core, largeness of the core, exactness.
JEL classification: C71.
1 Introduction
Cooperative (transferable utility) game theory analyzes the problem of sharing a common reward or cost
that has been obtained by means of cooperation among a group of agents. In order to study this type of
sharing problems, a cooperative game is introduced. A cooperative game is defined by the set of players and
a characteristic function that assigns to each possible group of players (or coalition) a real value representing
the total profit that this coalition can obtain by means of cooperation. This type of problem was first
analyzed within the framework of cooperative game theory in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). In
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the stable set is put forward as a solution concept for this type of
problems. The stable set of a game is the set of individually rational allocations which are both internally
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and externally stable. In other words, the stable set is the set of allocations for which each player gets at
least his standalone value, no allocation in the stable set is dominated by another allocation in the stable
set, and all allocations outside the stable set are dominated by elements in the stable set. The stable set can
be seen as a non-cooperative solution to a cooperative game: for any deviation of the set of elements in the
stable set, there is a preferable element in the stable set. In spite of this appealing foundation of the stable
set, three drawbacks appear: the stable set may be empty, the stable set may not be unique, and stable sets
are difficult to compute.
In Gillies (1953) a new solution concept was introduced: the core. The core of the game is the set of
efficient and coalitionally rational allocations. In other words, the core is the set of allocations that exactly
share the value obtained by means of cooperation in such a way that all coalitions get at least the value
that they can achieve by only cooperating among themselves. Although the core may be empty, it is one
of the most accepted and studied solution concepts in cooperative game theory. It is well known that the
core may be computed by means of a linear programming problem and that the core is internally stable
although it may not be externally stable. Moreover, the class of cooperative games with a non-empty core
is characterized as the class of balanced games (see Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)), which definition
only depends on the coalitional values of a game.
It is well-known that the core is contained in the stable set and that if the core is stable, then it is the only
stable set (see Driessen (1988)). One of the open questions in cooperative game theory is the characterization
of the class of games for which the core is stable. It is well-known that games with a large core (introduced
in Sharkey (1982)) have a stable core. A game is said to have a large core if for any coalitional rational
allocation (not necessarily efficient) there is a core element in which no player is better off than in the
original allocation. The idea behind largeness of the core is that if only the value of the grand coalition is
increased, then no player should be harmed by this, i.e. there is no core element in the new game that makes
always some player worse off according to the core elements of the initial game.
Largeness of the core has been studied in the literature with respect to different properties and/or classes
of games. Biswas, Parthasarathy and Ravindran (2001) analyzes largeness of the core with respect to stability
of the core and provide a characterization of largeness of the core by means of extendability in the stronger
sense. This condition establishes a relation between the elements of the lower bound of the upper core of
every subgame and the elements of the core.
Biswas, Parthasarathy, Potters and Voorneveld (1999) analyzes largeness of the core for exact games.
They show that exact games with at most four players have a large core, while for at least five players the
result does not hold. Moreover, for totally balanced symmetric games, largeness of the core, stability of the
core, and exactness are equivalent.
Van Gellekom, Potters and Reijnierse (1999) studies prosperity properties for cooperative games and
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show that largeness of the core is a prosperity property (i.e. we can always find a minimal value for the
grand coalition for which the core is large). A characterization of largeness of the core is given by means of
the extreme points of the upper core.
Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) provides a characterization of largeness of the core by means of the so called
concavification of a game and the elements of the core of the game. Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) also provides
an alternative proof to the equivalence of largeness of the core and strong extendability in the strongest
sense by means of the concavification of a game.
In this paper we provide two new characterizations of largeness of the core that further analyze the
structure of the core of this type of games. The first is given in terms of the basic solutions that provide
extreme points of the core. The second is given by means of the set of bases needed to provide core and
upper core elements.
All the characterizations of largeness of the core mentioned above are based on the structure of the core
of the game (and/or subgames), or on the structure of the upper core of the game (and/or subgames), or in
both. Although they provide an important insight into the structure of the core of games with a large core,
these characterizations are difficult to apply in practice since many times the structure of the core and/or
upper core are unknown.
Van Velzen, Hamers and Solymosi (2008) characterizes largeness of the core for chain-component additive
games by means of minimal covering families of the set of players and corresponding inequalities. Van Velzen
(2005) generalizes this result to the class of tree-component additive games. These characterizations do not
depend on the structures of the core and/or upper core of the corresponding game, but only on the coalitional
values of the game.
In this paper we generalize the result in van Velzen (2005) to the class of cooperative games. For this,
we first show that the generalization of the condition in van Velzen (2005) implies non-emptiness of the core
of a game. This step is not needed in van Velzen (2005) since tree-component additive games have always a
non-empty core as shown in LeBreton, Owen and Weber (1992).
It is well known that largeness of the core and stability of the core are not equivalent in general. Van
Gellekom et al. (1999) provides an example of a 6-players game with a stable core that is not large. By means
of the new characterizations, we show that stability of the core and largeness of the core are equivalent for
games with at most 5 players.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls some basic game theoretic notions. Section 3 is
devoted to the new characterizations of largeness of the core. Section 4 establishes the equivalence between
stability and largeness of the core for games with at most 5 players. Section 5 recalls some results from
the literature of largeness of the core and analyzes them by means of the new characterizations. Section 6
concludes with some final remarks.
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2 Preliminaries
A cooperative (transferable utility) game in characteristic function form is an ordered pair (N, v) where N
is a finite set of n = |N | players and v : 2N → R satisfies v(∅) = 0. In general, v(S) represents the value of
coalition S, i.e. the joint payoff that can be obtained by this coalition when its members decide to cooperate.
A cooperative game can reflect rewards or costs. In this paper we study games on terms of rewards. The
central question within a cooperative framework is how to share the revenues that are obtained by means of
cooperation among the players, i.e. how to share the value of the grand coalition, v(N), among the players.
The imputation set of a game (N, v), I(v), is the set of efficient allocations of v(N) that are individually
rational (i.e. to which no player can reasonably object). Formally,1
I(v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}.
One of the most studied solution concepts in cooperative game theory is the core of a game, first introduced
in Gillies (1953). The core of a game (N, v), Core(v), is the set of efficient allocations of v(N) (i.e. exactly
v(N) is shared among the players) that are coalitionally rational (i.e. to which no coalition can reasonably
object). Formally,
Core(v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N}.
It is well known that the core of a game is a polytope and therefore it can be expressed as the convex hull of
its extreme points. The upper core of a game (N, v), U(v), is the set of not necessarily efficient allocations
that are coalitionally rational. Formally,
U(v) = {x ∈ RN | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N}.
Given a game (N, v) and α ∈ R+, we define the game (N, vα) by
vα(S) =


v(S) if S ∈ 2N \ {N},
v(N) + α if S = N.
(2.1)
Note that the upper core of (N, v) can be written as the union of the cores of (N, vα) with α ≥ 0, i.e.
U(v) =
⋃
α∈R+
Core(vα).
Largeness of the core was first introduced in Sharkey (1982). The core of (N, v) is said to be large if
for every x ∈ U(v) there is a y ∈ Core(v) with yi ≤ xi for each i ∈ N . The lower bound set of (N, v) was
introduced in Sharkey (1982) and is defined as
L(v) = {x ∈ U(v) | there is no y ∈ U(v) such that y ≤ x and y 6= x}.
1Here and further, for any vector x ∈ RN and any S ⊂ N , we denote x(S) :=
∑
i∈S
xi.
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Note that Core(v) ⊂ L(v) and U(v) = L(v) + RN+ . It follows immediately that the core of (N, v) is large if
and only if Core(v) = L(v) (see Sharkey (1982) for a proof).
Since this paper focuses on largeness of the core, we assume without loss of generality that the game
under consideration is nonnegative2.
Finally, given a finite set N and S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, the incidence vector of S is defined as eS ∈ RN with
eSi = 1 if i ∈ S and e
S
i = 0 if i 6∈ S.
3 New characterizations of largeness of the core
In this section we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. For clarity of exposition all
proofs and auxiliary lemmas are postponed to the appendix.
3.1 Largeness of the core and minimal covers
In this subsection we provide an alternative characterization of games with a large core based on minimal
covers and corresponding minimal cover inequalities. Such a characterization was first proposed for the class
of tree-component additive games in Van Velzen (2005). Here, we extend the result in Van Velzen (2005) to
the general class of transferable utility games. For this, we first need to show that minimal cover inequalities
imply non-emptiness of the core.
Given a finite set N , a collection C ⊂ 2N \ {∅} is called a minimal cover of N if C 6= {N} and the
following two conditions are satisfied:
(CF1) ∪S∈CS = N ;
(CF2) ∪S∈C\{S′}S 6= N for all S
′ ∈ C;
By condition (CF1), it follows that C covers N ; by condition (CF2), we have that no element of C is
superfluous. We denote by MC(N) the set of minimal covers of N .
Given a finite set N and C ∈MC(N), for every i ∈ N we denote by ξ(C, i) the number of times that i is
“extra covered” in C, i.e. ξ(C, i) = |{S ∈ C | i ∈ S}| − 1. We denote by E(C) the set of elements of N that
are“ extra covered” by C, i.e. E(C) = {i ∈ N | ξ(C, i) > 0}.
Given a minimal cover C ∈ MC(N) of N , a vector µ ∈ R2
n−1
+ is said to be a vector of minimal cover
balanced weights (mc-balanced vector) for C if
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSe
S =
∑
i∈N
ξ(C, i)e{i}. (3.1)
2Given a game (N, v), we can always find a vector a ∈ RN such that the game (N,w) defined by w(S) = v(S) + a(S) for
every S ∈ 2N is nonnegative. It is well known that Core(w) = {x+ a | x ∈ Core(v)} and U(w) = {x+ a | x ∈ U(v)}.
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Note that µS = 0 for every S 6⊂ E(C) by nonnegativity of µ. We denote by M(C) the set of mc-balanced
vectors for C. It follows ∑
S∈C
eS = eN +
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSe
S (3.2)
for every µ ∈ M(C). Given a game (N, v) and a minimal cover C ∈ MC(N), the minimal cover inequality
associated to C is ∑
S∈C
v(S) ≤ v(N) + max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
. (3.3)
Next, we state the two main results of this subsection, which proofs can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. Let (N, v) be a game satisfying all minimal cover inequalities. Then, (N, v) has a non-empty
core.
Theorem 3.2. A game (N, v) has a large core if and only if all minimal cover inequalities are satisfied.
3.2 Largeness of the core and basic solutions
In this subsection we characterize largeness of the core in relation to the extreme points of the core. For this,
we need to introduce some new notation.
Given a finite set N , a collection of coalitions B = {S1, . . . , Sn} is called a base of N if {eS1, . . . , eSn} is
a base of RN . For every R ∈ 2N \ {∅}, we denote by {ηR(S,B)}S∈B the collection of weights such that
∑
S∈B
ηR(S,B)eS = eR.
If no confusion is to be expected, we omit B from the notation. Note that this collection of weights is unique.
We denote by B(N) the set of bases of N and by B+(N), B−(N), and B0(N) the sets of bases with
B+(N) = {B ∈ B(N) |N ∈ B and η
{i}(N) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N},
B−(N) = {B ∈ B(N) |N ∈ B and η
{i}(N) < 0 for some i ∈ N},
B0(N) = {B ∈ B(N) |N 6∈ B}.
Note that {B+(N),B−(N),B0(N)} forms a partition of B(N). Given a game (N, v) and a base B =
{S1, . . . , Sn} ∈ B(N), we consider the system of linear equations
x(Sk) = v(Sk) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since B is a base of N , the system of equations has a unique solution which we denote by xB . Analogously,
given α > 0 we denote by xB,α the unique solution to the system of linear equations given by
x(Sk) = v
α(Sk) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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The core and the upper core of a game can be computed as the set of optimal solutions to a series of
systems of linear inequalities. Given a game (N, v) and α ≥ 0, the systems of linear inequalities (LIα(v)) are
defined as
(LI
α
(v)) −
∑
i∈N xi ≥ −v(N)− α∑
i∈N xi ≥ v(N) + α∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ 2
N \ {∅, N}.
Then Core(v) = SOL(LI
0
(v)) and U(v) =
⋃
α∈R+
SOL(LI
α
(v)), where SOL(LIα(v)) denotes the set of optimal
solutions of LIα(v).
In order to characterize largeness of the core, we focus on necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee
that the core and the lower bound set coincide. The following result is a direct consequence of the fact that
a vector x¯ is an extreme point of SOL(LIα(v)) if and only if the system LIα(v) evaluated in x¯ contains at
least n tight equations that are linearly independent (see Chva`tal (1983)). The proof is therefore omitted.
Theorem 3.3. Let (N, v) be a game. Then,3
extr(Core(v)) = {xB | B ∈ B(N), xB ∈ Core(v)}.
From now on, we denote by B(N, v) the set of bases of N that provide extreme points of the core of
(N, v), i.e. B(N, v) = {B ∈ B(N) | xB ∈ Core(v)}. Analogously as above, we denote B+(N, v), B−(N, v),
and B0(N, v).
The next example illustrates the type of core structure needed for a game to have a large core. This is
done in terms of the extreme points of the core.
Example 3.1. Let (N, v) be the game with N = {1, 2, 3} and values v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N , v({1, 2}) =
v({1, 3}) = 1, v({2, 3}) = 0 and v(N) = 1.5. In Figure 1 we represent the core of the game together with the
core of (N, v0.5).
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
extr(Core(v)) B(N,v) extr(Core(v0.5)) B(N, v0.5)
A=(1.5,0,0) {{2}, {3}, N} E=(2,0,0) {{2}, {3}, N}
B=(1,0,0.5) {{2}, {1, 2}, N} F=(1,0,1) {{2}, {1, 2}, N}
C=(0.5,0.5,0.5) {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, N} G=(0,1,1) {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, N},
D=(1,0.5,0) {{3}, {1, 3}, N} {{1}, {1, 2}, N},
{{1}, {1, 3}, N}
H=(1,1,0) {{3}, {1, 3}, N}
Figure 1: Core of (N, v) and (N, v0.5) in Example 3.1.
3Here and further, extr denotes the set of “extreme points of”.
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We have that
Core(v) = conv{(1.5, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0.5), (0.5, 0.5, 0.5), (1, 0.5, 0)} and
B(N, v) = {{{2}, {3}, N}, {{2}, {1, 2}, N}, {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, N}, {{3}, {1, 3}, N}}.
Note thatB(N, v) = B+(N, v)∪B−(N, v) withB+(N, v) = {{{2}, {3}, N}, {{2}, {1, 2}, N}, {{3}, {1, 3}, N}}
and B−(N, v) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, N}}. It turns out that (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) is obtained as the solution associated to
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, N} and satisfies:
xB({1}) = v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3})− v(N), xB({2}) = v(N)− v({1, 3}), xB({3}) = v(N)− v({1, 2})
and xB({1}) = 0.5 > 0 = v({1}). Therefore, if we increase the value of the grand coalition by α ∈ (0, 0.5],
the solution xB,α is a core element of the new game (N, vα) with
xB,α({1}) = 0.5− α, xB,α({2}) = 0.5 + α, xB,α({3}) = 0.5 + α.
It turns out that the game does not have a large core since for α ∈ (0, 0.5], xB,α ∈ U(v) and there is no
x ∈ Core(v) with x ≤ xB,α. This is related to the fact that if xB,α ∈ U(v) and there exists x ∈ Core(v) with
x ≤ xB,α, then x = xB (see Lemma A.3). It can be seen that (N, v0.5) has a large core. 3
Next, we provide the first characterization of largeness of the core. It describes the relation between the
bases that provide core elements for the core of the game and for the core of the games resulting from the
original by increasing the value of the grand coalition.
Theorem 3.4. A game (N, v) has a large core if and only if B+(N, v) ⊃ B(N, vα) for every α > 0.
The following characterization of largeness of the core describes the type of extreme points of the core of
a game with a large core.
Theorem 3.5. A game (N, v) has a large core if and only if the following conditions are satisfied
(i) B+(N, v) is non-empty;
(ii) if B ∈ B+(N) \B+(N, v), then there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) = 0 and xB(R) < v(R).
(iii) if B ∈ B0(N) with xB(N)>v(N), then there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that xB(R)<v(R).
(iv) if B ∈ B−(N) \B−(N, v), then at least one of the following three conditions is satisfied
(a) there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) = 0 and xB(R) < v(R),
(b) there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) < 0 and xB(R) ≤ v(R),
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(c) min
R∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)<0
{
max
{
0,
1
|ηR(N)|
(
xB(R)− v(R)
)}}
< max
R∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)>0
{
1
ηR(N)
(
v(R)− xB(R)
)}
.
(v) if B ∈ B−(N, v), then there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) < 0 and xB(R) = v(R).
Condition (i) makes sure that B+(N, v) is non-empty and therefore the core is non-empty. Condition (ii)
makes sure that there are no bases in B+(N) that provide upper core elements but do not provide a core
element. Condition (iii) makes sure that there are no bases in B0(N) that provide upper core elements not
belonging to the core. Condition (iv) makes sure that there are no bases in B−(N) that provide upper core
elements but do not provide a core element. Condition (v) makes sure that there are no bases in B−(N)
that provide both core elements and upper core elements outside the core.
4 Largeness of the core and stability
An important open question in cooperative game theory is to determine whether the core of a game is stable
in the von Neumann-Morgenstein sense. Although there is not a characterization of the class of games with
a stable core, some classes of games have been analyzed for which the core is stable. It is well-known that
a game with a large core has a stable set (see Theorem 3 in Sharkey (1982)). Moreover, it is known that
a game with a stable core may not have a large core. In Van Gellekom et al. (1999) a 6 players game with
a stable core that is not large is provided (see Example 1 in Section 4.2). The question is now what is the
relation between largeness of the core and stability of the core for games with less than 6 players. Before
answering this question, we recall the definition of stability of the core (a´ la von Neumann-Morgenstein).
Let (N, v) be a game with a non-empty core. The core is called stable if for every imputation x ∈
I(v) \ Core(v) there exists a core element y ∈ Core(v) and a coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x(S) < v(S) such
that y(S) = v(S) and yi > xi for every i ∈ S.
It turns out that largeness of the core and stability of the core are equivalent for games with at most 5
players. The proof of this result is postponed to the appendix.
Theorem 4.1. A game (N, v) with |N | ≤ 5 has a stable core if and only if it has a large core.
5 Largeness of the core in the literature
5.1 Necessary conditions for largeness of the core
In Sharkey (1982) it is shown that subconvex games have a large core. A game (N, v) is subconvex (see Sharkey
(1982)) if for every partition P = {P1, . . . , Pk} of N and every collection of coalitions Q = {Q1, . . . , Qk}
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such that Ql ⊂
⋃l−1
m=0 Pm and Pk ∪Qk 6= N , where P0 = ∅, it follows
k∑
l=1
(v(Pl ∪Ql)− v(Ql)) ≤ v(N).
An alternative proof to Sharkey’s Theorem is by showing that every subconvex game satisfies the minimal
cover inequalities.
Theorem 5.1 (Sharkey (1982)). If (N, v) is subconvex, then (N, v) satisfies all minimal cover inequalities.
Proof: Let (N, v) be a subconvex game, we have to show that all minimal cover inequalities are satisfied.
Let C = {S1, . . . , Sk} be a minimal cover and define Pl = Sl \ (∪
l−1
m=0Sm) for l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where S0 = ∅,
Q1 = ∅, and Ql = Sl ∩ (∪
l−1
m=1Sm) for l ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Then,
k∑
l=1
v(Sl) =
k∑
l=1
v(Pl ∪Ql) =
k∑
l=1
(v(Pl ∪Ql)− v(Ql)) +
k∑
l=1
v(Ql)
≤ v(N) +
k∑
l=1
v(Ql) ≤ v(N) + max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
where the first equality follows by definition of {P1 . . . , Pk} and {Q1 . . . , Qk}, the first inequality is a direct
consequence of (N, v) subconvex, and the last inequality is a consequence of µ˜ defined as
µ˜S =


|{l ∈ {1, . . . , k} | S = Ql}| if S ∈ {Q1 . . . , Qk},
0 otherwise.
being an mc-balanced vector for C by definition of {Q1 . . . , Qk}. 2
From the proof above, we see that the concept of subconvexity introduced in Sharkey (1982) is close to
minimal cover inequalities. The only difference is that subconvexity explicitly selects the mc-balanced vector
of weights to be µQl = 1 for l ∈ {2, . . . , k} and µS = 0 for S 6∈ {Q2, . . . , Qk}.
Convex games where first introduced in Shapley (1971). Recall that a game (N, v) is convex if v(S) +
v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪T )+ v(S ∩T ) for every S, T ∈ 2N . It readily follows that convex games are also subconvex and
therefore have a large core. On page 180 in Sharkey (1982) it is stated “In fact it is easy to show that if n = 3,
then the core is large if and only if (N, v) is convex”. Note that Sharkey’s remark is not true since a three
players non superadditive game is not convex, but may have a large core. It turns out that subconvexity is
equivalent to largeness of the core for games with at most three players.
Theorem 5.2. A game (N, v) with n ≤ 3 satisfies all minimal cover inequalities if and only if it is subconvex.
Proof: If N = {1, 2}, it easily follows that there is only one minimal cover: {{1}, {2}}. Therefore, (N, v)
satisfies all minimal cover inequalities if and only if (N, v) has a non-empty core, which for two players games
is equivalent to both convexity and subconvexity.
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If N = {1, 2, 3}, then all minimal covers are either partitions of N or of the form {{i, j}, {i, k}} with
{i, j, k} = N . Let P = {P1, P2, P3} with P1 = {i}, P2 = {j}, and P3 = {k}, then
3∑
l=1
(v(Pl ∪Ql)− v(Ql)) =


v({i}) + v({j}) + v({k}) if Q = {∅, ∅, ∅},
v({j}) + v({i, k}) if Q = {∅, ∅, {i}},
v({i}) + v({j, k}) if Q = {∅, ∅, {j}},
v({i, j}) + v({i, k})− v({i}) if Q = {∅, {i}, {i}},
v({i, j}) + v({j, k})− v({j}) if Q = {∅, {i}, {j}}.
Let P = {P1, P2}. If P1 = {i, j} and P2 = {k}, then
2∑
l=1
(v(Pl ∪Ql)− v(Ql)) =


v({i, j}) + v({k}) if Q = {∅, ∅},
v({i, j}) + v({i, k})− v({i}) if Q = {∅, {i}},
v({i, j}) + v({j, k})− v({j}) if Q = {∅, {j}}.
If P1 = {k} and P2 = {i, j}, then Q = {∅, ∅} and
2∑
l=1
(v(Pl ∪Ql)− v(Ql)) = v({i, j}) + v({k}).
Therefore, it is easily seen that all minimal cover inequalities are satisfied if and only if the game is subcon-
vex. 2
The following example illustrates that subconvexity and largeness of the core are not equivalent for games
with more than three players.
Example 5.1. Let (N, v) be the game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and values given in Table 1.
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3} {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N
v(S) 5 5 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 0 10 10 5 5 14
Table 1: Coalitional values of the game in Example 5.1.
It is readily seen that all minimal cover inequalities are satisfied since v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S v({i}) for every
S ∈ 2N \ {∅} with 1 < |S| < 4, and
∑
i∈N v({i}) < v(N). Note that the game is not subconvex by taking
P = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}} and Q = {{∅}, {1, 2}} since
v({1, 2, 3}) + (v({1, 2, 4} − v({1, 2}))) = 10 + (10− 5) = 15 6≤ 14 = v(N). 3
5.2 Largeness of the core and exactness
In Biswas et al. (1999) the relation between largeness of the core and exactness is stablished. A game (N, v)
is exact (Schmeidler (1972)) if for every coalition R ∈ 2N \ {∅} there is a core allocation x ∈ Core(v) with
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x(R) = v(R).
Cso´ka, Herings and Ko´czy (2007) provides a characterization of exact games in terms of balanced con-
ditions. A collection E ⊂ 2N \ {∅} is exactly balanced if there exist a vector ε ∈ R2
n−1 such that εT ∈ R
for some T ∈ E, εS > 0 for S ∈ E, S 6= T , and
∑
R∈E εRe
R = eN . A game (N, v) is exactly balanced if∑
R∈E εRv(R) ≤ v(N) for all exactly balanced collections. It follows (see Cso´ka et al. (2007)) that a game is
exact if and only if it is exactly balanced.
In Biswas et al. (1999) it is shown that every exact game with at most four players has a large core. The
proof of this result can now be simplified by using Theorem 3.2 and the characterization of exact games by
means of exactly balanced collections.
Theorem 5.3 (Biswas et al. (1999)). If (N, v) is an exact game and n ≤ 4, then (N, v) satisfies all minimal
cover inequalities. If n ≥ 5, there are exact games (N, v) not satisfying all minimal cover inequalities.
Proof: Let (N, v) be an exact game. If n = 2, it follows that exactness of the game is equivalent to non-
emptiness of the core, which is equivalent to all minimal cover inequalities being satisfied (see proof of
Theorem 5.1).
If n = 3, it can be seen that all minimal covers are either a partition of N , or of the following form:
{{i, j}, {i, k}} with {i, j, k} = N . It is readily seen that a partition is an exactly balanced collection and
therefore the minimal cover inequalities for partitions of N are satisfied. We have to show that the mini-
mal cover inequalities are satisfied for {{i, j}, {i, k}}. Note that the collection {{i}, {i, j}, {i, k}} is exactly
balanced, with ε{i} = −1 and ε{i,j} = ε{i,k} = 1. Therefore
v({i, j}) + v({i, k}) = −v({i}) + v({i, j}) + v({i, k}) + v({i})
≤ v(N) + v({i})
≤ v(N) + max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
where the first inequality follows because the game is exact and therefore exactly balance, and the last
inequality follows since the vector which assigns 1 to coalition {i} and 0 to the other coalitions is mc-
balanced for C.
If n = 4, it can be seen that all minimal covers are either a partition of N , or of the following form:
{{j}, {i, k}, {i, l}}, {{i, j}, {i, k}, {i, l}}, {{i, j}, {i, k, l}} and {{i, j, k}, {i, j, l}}, with {i, j, k, l} = N . Since
every partition of N is exactly balanced, we only have to show that the minimal cover inequalities are
satisfied for the four above-mentioned types.
Note that {{j}, {i, k}, {i, l}} can be transformed in the exactly balanced collection {{i}, {j}, {i, k}, {i, l}}
with exactly balanced vector ε given by ε{i}=−1, ε{j}=ε{i,j}=ε{i,k}=1. Analogously, {{i, j}, {i, k}, {i, l}}
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can be transformed in the exactly balanced collection {{i}, {i, j}, {i, k}, {i, l}} with exactly balanced vector
ε given by ε{i} = −2, ε{i,j} = ε{i,k} = ε{i,l} = 1; {{i, j}, {i, k, l}} can be transformed in the exactly balanced
collection {{i}, {i, j}, {i, k, l}} with exactly balanced vector ε given by ε{i} = −1, ε{i,j} = ε{i,k,l} = 1;
{{i, j, k}, {i, j, l}} can be transformed in the exactly balanced collection {{i, j}, {i, j, k}, {i, j, l}}with exactly
balanced vector ε given by ε{i,j} = −1, ε{i,j,k} = ε{i,j,l} = 1. Following the same lines as in the case n = 3,
it is readily seen that the exactly balanced conditions of the derived exactly balanced collections imply the
minimal cover inequalities.
If n ≥ 5, it easily follows that the minimal cover {{i, j, k}, {i, j, l}, {i,m}}, where {i, j, k, l,m} = N ,
cannot be transformed in an exactly balanced collection. Therefore, exactness does not need to imply all
minimal cover inequalities. 2
6 Final remarks
In Theorem 3.5 we have characterized largeness of the core in terms of the extreme solutions, xB , to a
system of equations. Note that the result could be written down in terms of weights and coalitional values
following Lemma A.2 (iii), which would only difficult readability. The main contribution of Theorem 3.5 is
to understand the structure of the core of a game with a large core. According to Theorem 3.4, the set of
bases that provide core elements for (N, v) either remains the same, or decreases when we consider (N, vα)
with α > 0. In this sense, the “core is large” since the number of bases needed to describe the core of a game
is non increasing on the value of the grand coalition.
Note that both the core and the upper core of a game (N, v) may be described by means of the essential
coalitions of the core. A coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅} is called essential if v(S) >
∑t
l=1 v(S
l) for any non-trivial
partition {S1, . . . , St} of S. Hence, we can restrict Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 to the set of minimal covers which
elements are essential coalitions of the game. Analogously, we can restrict Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 to
the set of bases which elements are essential coalitions of the game. This may be interesting when applying
the results to a specific game in order to reduce computational time.
Appendix
Largeness of the core and minimal covers
In this part of the appendix, we show the two main results in Subsection 3.1. For this, we first provide an
auxiliary lemma.
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Lemma A.1. Let (N, v) be a game and let C ∈MC(N). Then it follows
(i) max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
= min
{ ∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)xi | x(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ⊂ E(C)
}
;
(ii) for every µ¯ ∈ argmaxµ∈M(C)
{∑
S∈2N\{∅} µSv(S)
}
, there exists x ∈ RE(C) such that x(S) ≥ v(S)
for every S ⊂ E(C), x(S) = v(S) for every S ⊂ E(C) with µ¯S > 0, and
∑
i∈E(C) ξ(C, i)xi =
maxµ∈M(C)
{∑
S∈2N\{∅} µSv(S)
}
.
Proof: Note that equation (3.3) can be written as the following linear programming problem:
max
∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
st ∑
S∈2N\{∅}:S∋i
µS ≤ ξ(C, i) for every i ∈ N,
µS ≥ 0 for every S ∈ 2
N \ {∅} .
Due to nonnegativity of µ, it can be alternatively written as the linear programming problem:
max
∑
S∈2E(C)\{∅}
µSv(S)
st ∑
S∈2E(C)\{∅}:S∋i
µS ≤ ξ(C, i) for every i ∈ E(C),
µS ≥ 0 for every S ∈ 2E(C) \ {∅},
which dual problem is
min
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)xi
st∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ 2E(C) \ {∅}.
(Note that the constraint xi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ E(C) has been omitted by nonnegativity of v).
(i) immediately follows by the Strong Duality Theorem (see Dantzig and Thapa (2003)).
(ii) immediately follows by the Complementary Slackness Theorem (see Dantzig and Thapa (2003)). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We construct an allocation vector x ∈ RN and show that x ∈ Core(v). Let
C = {S1, . . . , Sk} ∈MC(N) be such that
k∑
l=1
v(Sl)− max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
≥
∑
R∈C˜
v(R)− max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
for every C˜ ∈MC(N) (A.1)
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Without loss of generality, let
S1 \ E(C) = {1, 2, . . . , i1},
S2 \ E(C) = {i1 + 1, i1 + 2, . . . , i2},
...
Sk \ E(C) = {ik−1 + 1, ik−1 + 2, . . . , ik},
E(C) = {ik + 1, ik + 2, . . . , n}.
By Lemma A.1 (ii), there exists x¯ ∈ RE(C) such that
x¯(R) ≥ v(R) for every R ∈ 2E(C) \ {∅} (A.2)
and ∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)x¯i = max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
. (A.3)
Define x ∈ RN as follows: xi = x¯i for every i ∈ E(C) and xi is recursively defined for every i ∈ N \E(C) in
the following way:
x1 = max
R⊂E(C)
{v(R ∪ {1})− x(R)} if i1 6= 1, (A.4)
xi = max
R⊂E(C)∪{1,...,i−1}
{v(R ∪ {i})− x(R)} if i ∈ N \ E(C) and i 6∈ {1, i1, . . . , ik}, (A.5)
xil = v(Sl)− x(Sl \ {il})} if l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, (A.6)
xik = v(N)− x(N \ {ik}). (A.7)
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , ik} \ {i1, i2, . . . , ik}, fix T
i ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1} ∪ E(C) such that
xi = v(T
i ∪ {i})− x(T i). (A.8)
Next, we show that x ∈ Core(v). Efficiency immediately follows from the definition of xik (see equation
(A.7)). We recursively show coalitional rationality. Let S0 = E(C). If S ⊂ S0, then it readily follows that
x(S) ≥ v(S) by definition of x and equation (A.2). Next, assume that x(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ⊂ ∪t−1l=0Sl
with t ≤ k. Let S ⊂ ∪tl=1Sl such that S ∩ (St \S0) 6= ∅. We distinguish between two cases: it 6∈ S and it ∈ S.
Case 1: it 6∈ S.
In this case, let i ∈ St be such that S ⊂ (∪
t−1
l=0Sl) ∪ {it−1 + 1, . . . , i}. Note that i 6= it by assumption. It
follows that
x(S) = xi + x(S \ {i}) ≥ v(S)− x(S \ {i}) + x(S \ {i}) = v(S)
where the inequality is an immediate consequence of the definition of xi (see equation (A.5)).
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Case 2: it ∈ S.
For this case we construct a minimal cover C˜ based on C where coalition St is substituted by S and
coalitions T j
1
t1 ∪ {j1t1}, . . . , T
jr
tr ∪ {jrtr}, with j
1
t1
, . . . , jrtr ∈ St \ (S ∪ S0), as follows. If St \ S0 ⊂ S, define
C˜0 = {S1, . . . , St−1, S, St+1, . . . , Sk}. Otherwise, let {j11 , . . . , j
1
t1
} = St \ (S ∪ S0) with j11 < . . . < j
1
t1
.
If {j11 , . . . , j
1
t1
} ⊂ T j
1
t1 ∪ {j1t1}, define C˜0 = {S1, . . . , St−1, S, T
j1
t1 ∪ {j1t1}, St+1, . . . , Sk}. Otherwise, define
{j21 , . . . , j
2
t2
} = {j11 , . . . , j
1
t1
} \ (T j
1
t1 ∪ {j1t1}) and continue with this procedure. After r(≤ t1) steps we obtain
C˜0 = {S1, . . . , St−1, S, T
j1
t1 ∪ {j1t1}, . . . , T
jr
tr ∪ {jrtr}, St+1, . . . , Sk}. It readily follows that N = ∪R∈C˜0R since
St \ (S∪S0) ⊂ ∪rl=1(T
jl
tl ∪{jltl}) by construction of C˜0. Moreover, it > j
1
t1
> . . . > jrtr and therefore it 6∈ T
jl
tl
for every l ∈ {1, . . . , r} and jl
′
t
l′
6∈ T j
l
tl for every l ∈ {1, . . . , r− 1} and l′ ∈ {l+1, . . . , r} by definition of T j
l
tl .
If C˜0 ∈MC(N), then C˜ = C˜0. If C˜0 is no minimal cover, then we have that,
|{R ∈ C˜0|it ∈ R}| = |{S}| = 1,
|{R ∈ C˜0|j
l
tl
∈ R}| = |{T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}}| = 1 for every l ∈ {1, . . . , r},
and
|{R ∈ C˜0|il ∈ R}| = |{Sl}| = 1 for every l ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , k}
by construction of C˜0. Therefore, there exist I ⊂ {1, . . . , t− 1} such that C˜ = C˜0 \ {Sl| l ∈ I} ∈MC(N). It
readily follows that
ξ(C˜, i) = ξ(C, i)− |{l ∈ I ∪ {t}|i ∈ Sl}|+ |{R ∈ {S, T
j1
t1 ∪ {j1t1}, . . . , T
jr
tr ∪ {jrtr}}|i ∈ R}|
for every i ∈ N and as a consequence we have that
E(C˜) ⊂ E(C) ∪ {1, . . . , it − 1} = (∪
t
l=0Sl) \ {it} (A.9)
since T j
l
tl ⊂ E(C) ∪ {1, 2, . . . , jltl − 1} for every l ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Next, we have to distinguish between two
subcases: t < k and t = k.
Subcase 2.1: t < k.
In this subcase it follows x(S) = xit + x(S \ {it}) = v(St) − x(St \ {it}) + x(S \ {it}), where the second
equality follows by definition of xit (see equation (A.6)). Therefore we have to show that
v(S) ≤ v(St)− x(St \ {it}) + x(S \ {it}).
Note that
v(S) +
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
t−1∑
l=1
v(Sl)−
∑
l∈I
x(Sl) +
k∑
l=t+1
v(Sl)− max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
=
v(S) +
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
t−1∑
l=1
l 6∈I
v(Sl) +
k∑
l=t+1
v(Sl)− max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
=
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∑
R∈C˜
v(R)− max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
≤
k∑
l=1
v(Sl)− max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
=
k∑
l=1
v(Sl)−
∑
i∈N
ξ(C, i)xi
where the first equality follows because v(Sl) = x(Sl) for every l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} by definition of xil (see
equation (A.6)), the inequality is a direct consequence of equation (A.1), and the last equality follows because
ξ(C, i) = 0 for i 6∈ E(C), together with the definition of x and equation (A.3). Hence,
v(S) ≤ v(St)−
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl) + max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
−
∑
i∈N
ξ(C, i)xi
≤ v(St)−
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl) + max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRx(R)
}
−
∑
i∈N
ξ(C, i)xi
= v(St)−
r∑
l=1
x(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl) +
∑
i∈N
ξ(C˜, i)xi −
∑
i∈N
ξ(C, i)xi
= v(St)−
r∑
l=1
x(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl) +
[
x(S) +
r∑
l=1
x(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
t−1∑
l=1
l 6∈I
x(Sl) +
k∑
l=t+1
x(Sl)− x(N)
]
−
[ k∑
l=1
x(Sl)− x(N)
]
= v(St)− x(St) + x(S)
= v(St)− x(St \ {it}) + x(S \ {it})
where the first inequality follows by reordering the terms in the inequality derived above; the second inequality
follows by equation(A.9) and v(R) ≤ x(R) for every R ∈ (∪tl=0Sl) \ {it} by induction and Case 1; the first
equality follows by both the definition of xjl
tl
(see equation (A.5)) and T j
l
tl (see equation (A.8)), and the
definition of mc-balanced vector for C˜; the second equality is a direct consequence of equations (3.1) and
(3.2); the last equality readily follows since it ∈ S ∩ St.
Subcase 2.2: t = k.
In this subcase it follows x(S) = xik + x(S \ {ik}) = v(N)− x(N \ {ik}) + x(S \ {ik}). Therefore we have to
show that
v(S) ≤ v(N)− x(N \ {ik}) + x(S \ {ik}).
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Note that
k−1∑
l=1
l 6∈I
v(Sl) + v(S) +
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) =
∑
R∈C˜
v(R) ≤ v(N) + max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
since (N, v) satisfies all minimal cover inequalities. Hence,
v(S) ≤ v(N)−
k−1∑
l=1
l 6∈I
v(Sl)−
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) + max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
= v(N)−
k−1∑
l=1
v(Sl) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl)−
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) + max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRv(R)
}
≤ v(N)−
k−1∑
l=1
v(Sl) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl)−
r∑
l=1
v(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) + max
µ∈M(C˜)
{ ∑
R∈2N\{∅}
µRx(R)
}
= v(N)−
k−1∑
l=1
x(Sl) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl)−
r∑
l=1
x(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
∑
i∈N
ξ(C˜, i)xi
= v(N)−
k−1∑
l=1
x(Sl) +
∑
l∈I
x(Sl)−
r∑
l=1
x(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
[
x(S) +
r∑
l=1
x(T j
l
tl ∪ {jltl}) +
k−1∑
l=1
l 6∈I
x(Sl)− x(N)
]
= v(N)− x(N) + x(S)
= v(St)− x(N \ {ik}) + x(S \ {ik})
where the first inequality follows by reordering the terms in the inequality derived above; the first equality
follows because v(Sl) = x(Sl) for every l ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1} by definition of xil (see equation (A.6)); the second
inequality follows by equation(A.9) and v(R) ≤ x(R) for every R ∈ (∪kl=0Sl) \ {ik} by induction and Case 1;
the second equality follows by both the definition of mc-balanced vector for C˜ and the definition of xjl
tl
(see
equation (A.5)) and T j
l
tl (see equation (A.8)); the third equality is a direct consequence of equations (3.1)
and (3.2); the last equality readily follows since ik ∈ S ∩N . 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
First we show the “if” part which is inspired in the proof of Theorem 5 in Sharkey (1982). Let (N, v)
be a game satisfying all minimal cover inequalities. By Theorem 3.1 it follows that (N, v) has a non-empty
core. We have to show that L(v) = Core(v). We proceed by contradiction. Assume on the contrary that
L(v) 6= Core(v), then there exists x ∈ L(v) \ Core(v). Note that x(N) > v(N).
First we show that for every i ∈ N there exist S ∈ 2N \{∅} with i ∈ S and x(S) = v(S) by contradiction.
Assume on the contrary that the there is i ∈ N such that x(S) > v(S) for every S ∈ 2N \ {∅} with i ∈ S.
Then we can take ǫ > 0 and xǫ defined by xǫj = xj for every j ∈ N \ {i} and x
ǫ
i = xi − ǫ such that
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xǫ(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Since xǫ ≤ x and xǫ 6= x, we may conclude that x 6∈ L(v), establishing
a contradiction.
For each i ∈ N , let Si ∈ 2N \ {∅} be a coalition such that i ∈ Si and x(Si) = v(Si). Note that: (i) Si 6= N
for every i ∈ N since x ∈ L(v)\Core(v) and (ii) ∪i∈NSi = N . It is readily seen that there is a minimal cover
C ⊂ {Si}i∈N . Let {i1, . . . , ik} ⊂ N such that C = {Si}i∈N\{i1,...,ik}. Then, it follows
x(N) =
∑
S∈C
x(S) −
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)xi
=
∑
S∈C
v(S)−
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)xi
≤
∑
S∈C
v(S)−min
{ ∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)x˜i | x˜(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ E(C)
}
≤ v(N)
where the second equality is a direct consequence of how C has been constructed, the first inequality follows
by Lemma A.1 (i), and the second inequality is a direct consequence of all minimal cover inequalities being
satisfied. Hence, this establishes a contradiction and therefore L(v) = Core(v).
The “only if” part follows the same lines and arguments as the proof of Theorem 3.3.1 in van Velzen
(2005). We provide it here for the sake of completeness.
Let (N, v) be a balanced game with a large core. We have to show that all minimal cover inequalities are
satisfied. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that there is a minimal cover C which inequality is violated,
i.e. ∑
S∈C
v(S) > v(N) + max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
. (A.10)
We construct x ∈ U(v)\Core(v) such that there is no y ∈ Core(v) with y ≤ x, contradicting the fact that
(N, v) has a large core. Let xˆ ∈ RE(C) be a solution to min
{∑
i∈E(C) ξi(C)x˜i | x˜(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ E(C)
}
and define x ∈ RN by
xi =


xˆi if i ∈ E(C)
v(N) if i ∈ N \ E(C).
It easily follows that x ∈ U(v) since for S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, we have that x(S) = xˆ(S) ≥ v(S) if S ⊂ E(C) and
x(S) ≥ xˆ(S ∩E(C)) + v(N) ≥ v(S ∩E(C)) + v(N) ≥ v(S) if S 6⊂ E(C) where the first inequality follows by
non-negativity of (N, v), the second inequality follows by feasibility of xˆ, and the last inequality follows by
non-negativity of (N, v) and non-emptiness of the core of (N, v).
Since (N, v) has a large core, we can take y ∈ Core(v) such that y ≤ x. Then,
∑
S∈C
y(S) = y(N) +
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)yi
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= v(N) +
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)yi
≤ v(N) +
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)xi
= v(N) +
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)xˆi
= v(N) + min
{ ∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)x˜i |
∑
i∈S
x˜i ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ E(C)
}
= v(N) + max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
<
∑
S∈C
v(S)
where the second equality follows because y ∈ Core(v), the third equality follows by definition of x, the
fourth equality follows by definition of xˆ, the fifth equality follows by Lemma A.1 (i) and the last inequality
follows by equation (A.10). Hence, it follows that
∑
S∈C y(S) <
∑
S∈C v(S). We may conclude that there is
S ∈ C with y(S) < v(S), which contradicts y ∈ Core(v). 2
Largeness of the core and basic solutions
In this part of the appendix, we show the two main results in Subsection 3.2. For this, we first provide two
auxiliary lemmas.
The following result gives some relations between the weights that a base assigns to a coalition and
the weights that the same base assigns to its members. It follows straightforward from the fact that eR =∑
i∈R e
{i} and therefore the proof is omitted.
Lemma A.2. Let (N, v) be a game and let B ∈ B(N). Then,
(i) ηR(S) =
∑
i∈R η
{i}(S) for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅} and every S ∈ B,
(ii) xBi =
∑
S∈B η
{i}(S)v(S) for every i ∈ N ,
(iii) xB(R) =
∑
S∈B η
R(S)v(S) for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅},
(iv) xB,α(R) =


xB(R) + αηR(N) if N ∈ B,
xB(R) if N 6∈ B,
for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
The next result states that if B ∈ B(N) provides an element xB,α (α > 0) of the upper core of a game
(N, v) such that xB,α ≥ x for some core element x, then x is induced by B.
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Lemma A.3. Let (N, v) be a balanced game and let B ∈ B(N) be such that xB,α ∈ U(v) for some α > 0.
If there exist x ∈ Core(v) with x ≤ xB,α, then x = xB .
Proof: Let x ∈ Core(v) be such that x ≤ xB,α. Then x(N) = v(N) and for S ∈ B \ {N} it follows
v(S) ≤ x(S) ≤ xB,α(S) = vα(S) = v(S)
and therefore x(S) = v(S). Here, the first inequality is a direct consequence of x ∈ Core(v), the second in-
equality follows by assumption, the first equality is a direct consequence of the definition of xB,α, and the last
inequality follows by definition of vα together with S 6= N . Therefore, x(S) = v(S) for every S ∈ B. Thus it
follows that x = xB by uniqueness of solution to the system of linear equations y(S) = v(S) for every S ∈ B.2
Proof of Theorem 3.4. First we show the “only if” part. Let (N, v) have a large core. We have to show
that B+(N, v) ⊃ B(N, vα) for every α > 0. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists α¯ > 0
such that B(N, vα) 6⊂ B+(N, v) and let B ∈ B(N, v
α) \B+(N, v).
If B ∈ B0(N), then xB,α¯ = xB by Lemma A.2 (iv). By largeness of the core, there exists y ∈ Core(v)
such that y ≤ xB,α¯. By Lemma A.3 we have that y = xB ∈ Core(v). This establishes a contradiction since
xB,α¯ = xB with xB,α¯ ∈ Core(vα¯) and α¯ > 0.
If B ∈ B−(N), then there exists i ∈ N such that η{i}(N) < 0 and x
B,α¯
i = x
B
i + α¯η
{i}(N) < xBi by
Lemma A.2 (iv). By largeness of the core, there exists y ∈ Core(v) such that y ≤ xB,α¯. By Lemma A.3 we
have that y = xB ∈ Core(v). This establishes a contradiction since xB,α¯i < x
B
i .
If B ∈ B+(N), then x
B 6∈ Core(v) since B 6∈ B+(N, v). By largeness of the core, there exists y ∈ Core(v)
such that y ≤ xB,α¯. By Lemma A.3 we have that y = xB , establishing a contradiction.
Next we show the “if” part. Let (N, v) be a game with B+(N, v) ⊃ B(N, vα) for every α > 0. We have to
show that (N, v) has a large core. For this it suffices to show that for every α > 0 and every B ∈ B(N, vα),
there exists y ∈ Core(v) with y ≤ xB,α. By Lemma A.3, this is equivalent to show that xB ∈ Core(v) and
xB ≤ xB,α. Since B(N, vα) ⊂ B+(N, v) for every α > 0, it readily follows xB ∈ Core(v) and xB ≤ xB,α for
every α > 0 and every B ∈ B(N, vα) by Lemma A.2 (iv). 2
Proof of Theorem 3.5. First we show the “only if” part. Let (N, v) be a game with a large core. By
Theorem 3.4 it follows that B+(N, v) ⊃ B(N, vα) for every α > 0. We show that (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v)
are satisfied.
(i) Since B+(N, v) ⊃ B(N, vα) for every α > 0 and there exist α¯ > 0 with B(N, vα) 6= ∅, it readily follows
that B+(N, v) 6= ∅.
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(ii) We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists B ∈ B+(N)\B+(N, v) such that xB(R) ≥ v(R)
for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with ηR(N) = 0. Since B ∈ B+(N) \ B+(N, v) and therefore xB 6∈ Core(v),
there must be R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) > 0 and xB(R) < v(R). By Lemma A.2 (iv), we have
that xB,α(R) = xB(R) + αηR(N) for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅}. By fixing α¯ ≥ max{v(R) − xB(R) |R ∈
2N \ {∅} with xB(R) < v(R)} it readily follows that xB,α¯ ∈ Core(vα¯). Hence B ∈ B(N, vα¯) 6⊂
B+(N, v), establishing a contradiction.
(iii) Since B+(N, v) ⊃ B(N, vα) for every α > 0, it follows that B0(N, vα) = ∅. Let B ∈ B0(N) with
xB(N) = v(N) +α for some α > 0. By Lemma A.2 (iv) we have that xB = xB,α. Since B 6∈ B(N, vα),
there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅, N} such that v(R) > xB,α(R) = xB(R).
(iv) We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists B ∈ B−(N) \B−(N, v) such that (a), (b), and
(c) are not satisfied. Then we have that
(a’) xB(R) ≥ v(R) for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with ηR(N) = 0,
(b’) xB(R) > v(R) for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with ηR(N) < 0, and
(c’) min
R∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)<0
{
max
{
0,
1
|ηR(N)|
(
xB(R)− v(R)
)}}
≥ max
R∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)>0
{
1
ηR(N)
(
v(R)− xB(R)
)}
.
Note that 1
|ηR(N)|
(
xB(R) − v(R)
)
> 0 for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with ηR(N) < 0 by (b’). Moreover,
since B ∈ B−(N) \B−(N, v) we have that xB 6∈ Core(v). By (a’) and (b’) it follows that there exists
R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with ηR(N) > 0 and v(R) > xB(R). Fix α¯ = minR∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)<0
{
max
{
0, 1|ηR(N)|
(
xB(R) −
v(R)
)}}
, next we show that xB,α¯ ∈ Core(vα¯).
By Lemma A.2 (iv), we have that xB,α¯(R) = xB(R)+α¯ηR(N) for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Then xB,α¯(N) =
xB(N) + α¯ηN (N) = v(N) + α¯ = vα¯(N) and efficiency follows. Next, we show coalitional rationality.
Let R ∈ 2N \ {∅, N}. If ηR(N) = 0, then xB,α¯(R) = xB(R) ≥ v(R) by (a’). If ηR(N) < 0, then
xB,α¯(R) = xB(R) + α¯ηR(N)
= xB(R) + min
R˜∈2N\{∅}
ηR˜(N)<0
{
max
{
0,
1
|ηR˜(N)|
(
xB(R˜)− v(R˜)
)}}
ηR(N)
= xB(R) + min
R˜∈2N\{∅}
ηR˜(N)<0
{
1
|ηR˜(N)|
(
xB(R˜)− v(R˜)
)}
ηR(N)
≥ xB(R) +
ηR(N)
|ηR(N)|
(
xB(R)− v(R)
)
= xB(R)−
(
xB(R)− v(R)
)
= v(R)
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where the second equality follows by definition of α¯, the third one is a direct consequence of (b’),
the inequality follows because ηR(N) < 0, and the fourth equality is also a direct consequence of
ηR(N) < 0. If ηR(N) > 0 and xB(R) ≥ v(R), then xB,α¯(R) = xB(R) + α¯ηR(N) > xB(R) ≥ v(R). If
ηR(N) > 0 and xB(R) < v(R), then
xB,α¯(R) = xB(R) + α¯ηR(N)
= xB(R) + min
R˜∈2N\{∅}
ηR˜(N)<0
{
max
{
0,
1
|ηR˜(N)|
(
xB(R˜)− v(R˜)
)}}
ηR(N)
≥ xB(R) + max
R˜∈2N\{∅}
ηR˜(N)>0
{
1
ηR˜(N)
(
v(R˜)− xB(R˜)
)}
ηR(N)
≥ xB(R) +
ηR(N)
ηR(N)
(
v(R)− xB(R)
)
= xB(R) +
(
v(R)− xB(R)
)
= v(R)
where the inequality follows by (c’). Therefore, xB,α¯ ∈ Core(vα¯) and B ∈ B−(N, vα¯), establishing a
contradiction.
(v) We proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists B ∈ B−(N, v) satisfying xB(R) > v(R) for
every R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with ηR(N) < 0. Define α¯ = minR∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)<0
{ 1
|ηR(N)|
(xB(R) − v(R))}. Note that
α¯ > 0. Next we show that xB,α¯ ∈ Core(vα¯).
By Lemma A.2 (iv), we have that xB,α¯(R) = xB(R)+α¯ηR(N) for every R ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Then xB,α¯(N) =
xB(N) + α¯ηN (N) = v(N) + α¯ = vα¯(N) and efficiency follows. Next, we show coalitional rationality.
Let R ∈ 2N \ {∅, N}. If ηR(N) ≥ 0, then xB,α¯(R) = xB(R) + α¯ηR(N) ≥ xB(R) ≥ v(R) where the last
inequality follows because xB ∈ Core(v). If ηR(N) < 0, then
xB,α¯(R) = xB(R) + α¯ηR(N)
= xB(R) + min
R˜∈2N\{∅}
ηR˜(N)<0
{
1
|ηR˜(N)|
(
xB(R˜)− v(R˜)
)}
ηR(N)
≥ xB(R) +
ηR(N)
|ηR(N)|
(
xB(R)− v(R)
)
= xB(R)−
(
xB(R)− v(R)
)
= v(R)
where the inequality and the third equality follow because ηR(N) < 0. Therefore, xB,α¯ ∈ Core(vα¯)
and B ∈ B−(N, vα¯), establishing a contradiction.
Next we show the “if” part. Let (N, v) be a game satisfying (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v). We have to show that
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(N, v) has a large core. By Theorem 3.4 it suffices to show that B(N, vα) ⊂ B+(N, v) for every α > 0. Note
that B+(N, v) 6= ∅ by (i).
Next we show that B0(N, v
α) = ∅ for every α > 0. By (iii), if B ∈ B0(N) with xB(N) > v(N), then
there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that xB(R) < v(R). By Lemma A.2 (iv) we have that xB,α = xB for every
α > 0. Hence B 6∈ B0(N, vα) for every α > 0 and it readily follows that B0(N, vα) = ∅ for every α > 0.
Next we show that B−(N, v
α) = ∅ for every α > 0. If B ∈ B−(N, v), then there exists R ∈ 2
N \ {∅} such
that ηR(N) < 0 and xB(R) = v(R) by (v). By Lemma A.2 (iv), we have that xB,α(R) = xB(R)+αηR(N) <
xB(R) = v(R) for every α > 0. Hence B 6∈ B−(N, vα) for every α > 0.
If B ∈ B−(N) \B−(N, v), then at least one of the conditions (a), (b), and (c) is satisfied by (iv). If (a)
is satisfied, then there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) = 0 and xB(R) < v(R). By Lemma A.2 (iv)
we have that xB,α(R) = xB(R) + αηR(N) = xB(R) < v(R) for every α > 0. Hence B 6∈ B−(N, vα) for
every α > 0. If (b) is satisfied, then there exists R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) < 0 and xB(R) ≤ v(R).
By Lemma A.2 (iv) we have that xB,α(R) = xB(R) + αηR(N) < xB(R) ≤ v(R) for every α > 0. Hence
B 6∈ B−(N, vα) for every α > 0. If (a) and (b) are not satisfied, then (c) is satisfied. Besides, there exists
R ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) > 0 and xB(R) < v(R) since B 6∈ B−(N, v). Fix
R¯ ∈ arg max
R∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)>0
{
1
ηR(N)
(
v(R)− xB(R)
)}
and R˜ ∈ arg min
R∈2N\{∅}
ηR(N)<0
{
max
{
0,
1
|ηR(N)|
(
xB(R)− v(R)
)}}
.
Let 0 < α < 1
ηR¯(N)
(
v(R¯) − xB(R¯)). By Lemma A.2 (iv) we have that xB,α(R¯) = xB(R¯) + αηR¯(N) <
xB(R¯) + η
R¯(N)
ηR¯(N)
(
v(R¯)− xB(R¯)
)
= v(R¯) and therefore B 6∈ B−(N, vα).
Let α ≥ 1
ηR¯(N)
(
v(R¯)− xB(R¯)). By (c) we have that α > 1
|ηR˜(N)|
(
xB(R˜)− v(R˜)
)
. By Lemma A.2 (iv) we
have that xB,α(R˜) = xB(R˜)+αηR˜(N) < xB(R˜)+ η
R˜(N)
|ηR˜(N)|
(
xB(R˜)−v(R˜)
)
= xB(R˜)−
(
xB(R˜)−v(R˜)
)
= v(R˜)
where the inequality follows because ηR˜(N) < 0. Hence B 6∈ B−(N, vα). Consequently, B−(N, vα) = ∅.
Therefore, B(N, vα) = B+(N, v
α) for every α > 0. Finally, we show that B+(N, v
α) ⊂ B+(N, v) for
every α > 0. By (ii), if B ∈ B+(N) \ B+(N, v), then there exists R ∈ 2
N \ {∅} such that ηR(N) = 0 and
xB(R) < v(R). By Lemma A.2 (iv) we have that xB,α(R) = xB(R) + αηR(N) = xB(R) < v(R) for every
α > 0. Hence B 6∈ B+(N, vα) for every α > 0. Therefore B+(N, vα) ⊂ B+(N, v) for every α > 0. 2
Largeness of the core and stability
In this part of the appendix, we show the main result in Section 4. Before starting the proof of Theorem 4.1,
we pay attention to the structure of the minimal covers for games with at most 5 players. If N = {1, 2},
then there is only one minimal cover C = {{1}, {2}}, and |E(C)| = 0. If N = {1, 2, 3}, then a minimal cover
C ∈ MC(N) satisfies |E(C)| ≤ 1; if |E(C)| = 1 then C is of the form: {{i, j}, {i, k}} with {i, j, k} = N . If
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N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, then a minimal cover C ∈MC(N) satisfies |E(C)| ≤ 2; if |E(C)| = 2 then C is of the form:
{{i, j, k}, {i, j, l}}, with {i, j, k, l} = N . If N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, then a minimal cover C ∈ MC(N) satisfies
|E(C)| ≤ 3; if |E(C)| = 3 then C is of the form: {{i, j, k, l}, {i, j, k,m}}, with {i, j, k, l,m} = N .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let (N, v) be a game with |N | ≤ 5. It is well known that if (N, v) has a large core,
then the core is stable (see Theorem 3 in Sharkey (1982)). Therefore, we only have to show that if (N, v)
has a stable core, then the core is large. Note that non-emptiness of the core is equivalent to both largeness
of the core and stability of the core for |N | = 2. Therefore, we only have to show the result for |N | > 2.
We proceed by contradiction. We suppose that (N, v) has a stable core that is not large. Then we construct
x ∈ I(v) \ Core(v) in such a way that there is no y ∈ Core(v) and S ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x(S) < v(S) such that
y(S) = v(S) and xi < yi for every i ∈ S. This establishes a contradiction since (N, v) has a stable core.
Fix C ∈MC(N) such that
∑
S∈C
v(S) > v(N) + max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
.
It follows that |E(C)| > 0 by non-emptiness of the core. We assume without loss of generality that 1 ∈ E(C).
Let z˜ ∈ Core(v), then
∑
S∈C
v(S) ≤
∑
S∈C
z˜(S) = z˜(N) +
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)z˜i = v(N) +
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)z˜i
<
∑
S∈C
v(S)− max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
+
∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)z˜i
and therefore ∑
i∈E(C)
ξ(C, i)z˜i > max
µ∈M(C)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
µSv(S)
}
(A.11)
for every z˜ ∈ Core(v). As a result, for each z˜ ∈ Core(v) there exists at least one i ∈ E(C) such that
z˜i > v({i}). Then, we fix z ∈ Core(v) satisfying
z ∈ arg min
z˜∈Core(v)
{ ∑
S∈2N\{∅}
ξ(C, i)z˜i
}
. (A.12)
We distinguish between three cases: |E(C)| = 1, |E(C)| = 2, and |E(C)| = 3.
Case 1: |E(C)| = 1.
Recall that 1 ∈ E(C) and therefore z1 > v({1}) by equation (A.11).
Fix 0 < ε ≤ min{z(R)−v(R)|R ∈ 2N , 1 ∈ R, z(R) > v(R)} and define x ∈ RN as x1 = z1−ε, x2 = z2+ε,
and xj = zj for every j ∈ N \ {1, 2}. It readily follows that x ∈ I(v) \Core(v) by selection of ε, z1 > v({1}),
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and equation (A.12). Note that for R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x(R) < v(R) we have that z(R) = v(R) , 1 ∈ R, and
2 6∈ R by definition of x and selection of ε.
By stability of the core, there exist y ∈ Core(v) and S ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x(S) < v(S) such that y(S) = v(S)
and yj > xj for every j ∈ S. Define β ∈ RN as β = y − x. It readily follows that β(N) = 0, β(S) = ε,
and βj > 0 for every j ∈ S. Moreover, β1 ≥ ε since y ∈ Core(v) and therefore y1 ≥ z1 = x1 + ε, where
the inequality follows by equation (A.12) and the equality follows by definition of x. Note that 1 ∈ S and
S 6= {1}, hence
ε = β(S) = β1 + β(S \ {1}) > β1 ≥ ε
establishing a contradiction.
As a result, if (N, v) does not have a large core, then there must be a minimal cover C with |E(C)| > 1
that does not satisfy the minimal cover inequality. Consequently, we show that stability of the core implies
largeness of the core for |N | = 3.
Case 2: |E(C)| = 2.
Assume without loss of generality that E(C) = {1, 2} and ξ(C, 1) ≥ ξ(C, 2). We distinguish between two
subcases: |N | = 4 and |N | = 5.
Subcase 2.1: |N | = 4.
Note that C = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}} and therefore ξ(C, 1) = ξ(C, 2). By equation (A.11) there exists i ∈ {1, 2}
such that zi > v({i}). Assume without loss of generality that z1 > v({1}).
Fix 0 < ε ≤ min{z(R) − v(R) |R ∈ 2N , 1 ∈ R, z(R) > v(R)} and define, for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, xi ∈ RN
as xi1 = z1 − ε, x
i
i = zi + ε, and x
i
j = zj for j ∈ N \ {1, i}. For i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, it readily follows that
xi ∈ I(v) \ Core(v) by selection of ε, z1 > v({1}), and equation (A.12). Note that for i ∈ N \ {1, 2} and
R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(R) < v(R) we have that z(R) = v(R), 1 ∈ R, and i 6∈ R by definition of xi and
selection of ε.
By stability of the core, for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, there exist yi ∈ Core(v) and Si ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(Si) < v(Si)
such that yi(Si) = v(Si) and yij > x
i
j for every j ∈ S
i. Define βi ∈ RN as βi = yi − xi. It readily follows
that βi(N) = 0, βi(Si) = ε, and βij > 0 for every j ∈ S
i. Moreover for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, it readily follows that
βi({1, 2}) ≥ ε since yi ∈ Core(v) and therefore yi({1, 2}) ≥ z({1, 2}) = xi({1, 2}) + ε, where the inequality
follows by equation (A.12) and the equality follows by definition of xi. Note that for i ∈ N \{1, 2}, Si 6= {1, 2}
by equation (A.11). Hence, if 2 ∈ Si, then Si \ {1, 2} 6= ∅ and
ε = βi(Si) = βi({1, 2}) + βi(Si \ {1, 2}) > βi({1, 2}) ≥ ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore {1, 2} 6⊂ Si for i ∈ N\{1, 2}. Hence, it readily follows that S3 = {1, 4},
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S4 = {1, 3} and then z({1, 3}) = v({1, 3}) and z({1, 4}) = v({1, 4}). Therefore, β3({1, 4}) = ε, β3({1, 2}) ≥ ε,
β3({1, 3}) ≥ 0 and β3(N) = 0. Hence,
2ε ≤ β3({1, 4}) + β3({1, 2}) + β3({1, 3}) = 2β31 < 2β
3({1, 4}) = 2ε
establishing a contradiction.
As a result, if (N, v) does not have a large core, then there must be a minimal cover C with |E(C)| > 2
that does not satisfy the minimal cover inequality. However, |N | = 4 and therefore |E(C)| ≤ 2 for every
C ∈MC(N). Consequently, we show that stability of the core implies largeness of the core for |N | = 4.
Subcase 2.2: |N | = 5.
We consider two new subcases: ξ(C, 1) = ξ(C, 2) and ξ(C, 1) > ξ(C, 2).
Subcase 2.2.1: ξ(C, 1) = ξ(C, 2).
By equation (A.11) there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that zi > v({i}). Assume without loss of generality that
z1 > v({1}).
Fix 0 < ε ≤ min{z(R) − v(R) |R ∈ 2N , 1 ∈ R, z(R) > v(R)} and define, for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, xi ∈ RN
as xi1 = z1 − ε, x
i
i = zi + ε, and x
i
j = zj for j ∈ N \ {1, i}. For i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, it readily follows that
xi ∈ I(v) \ Core(v) by selection of ε, z1 > v({1}), and equation (A.12). Note that for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, if
R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(R) < v(R), we have that z(R) = v(R), 1 ∈ R, and i 6∈ R by definition of xi and
selection of ε.
By stability of the core, for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, there exist yi ∈ Core(v) and Si ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(Si) < v(Si)
such that yi(Si) = v(Si) and yij > x
i
j for every j ∈ S
i. Define βi ∈ RN as βi = yi − xi. It readily follows
that βi(N) = 0, βi(Si) = ε, and βij > 0 for every j ∈ S
i. Moreover for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, βi({1, 2}) ≥ ε
since yi ∈ Core(v) and therefore yi({1, 2}) ≥ z({1, 2}) = xi({1, 2}) + ε, where the inequality follows by
equation (A.12) and the equality follows by definition of xi. Besides, it is easily seen that, for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}
and R ∈ 2N \ {∅}, z(R) > v(R) in the following situations:
• 1, i ∈ R and βi(R) < 0; • 1 ∈ R, i 6∈ R, and βi(R) < ε;
• i ∈ R, 1 6∈ R, and βi(R) < −ε; • 1, i 6∈ R and βi(R) < 0.
Note that for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, Si 6= {1, 2} by equation (A.11). Hence, if 2 ∈ Si, then Si \ {1, 2} 6= ∅ and
ε = βi(Si) = βi({1, 2}) + βi(Si \ {1, 2}) > βi({1, 2}) ≥ ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore {1, 2} 6⊂ Si for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}. Hence, it readily follows that S3 ∈
{{1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 4, 5}}, S4 ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 5}, {1, 3, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}.
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• Let S3 = {1, 4, 5}, then β3({1, 4, 5}) = ε and β3j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 4, 5}. Moreover, β
3
2 ≥ β
3({4, 5}) > 0
since β3({1, 2}) ≥ ε. Note that
z(R) > v(R) for R ∈ {{1, 4}, {1, 5}} since β3(R) < β3({1, 4, 5}) = ε; (A.13)
z(R) > v(R) for R ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}} since β3(R) = −β3(N \R) < 0. (A.14)
Equations (A.13) and (A.14) establish a contradiction with S4 ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 5}, {1, 3, 5}} and S5 ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4},
{1, 3, 4}}. Hence, S3 6= {1, 4, 5} and analogously S4 6= {1, 3, 5} and S5 6= {1, 3, 4}. Therefore, S3 ∈
{{1, 4}, {1, 5}}, S4 ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4}}.
• Let S3 = {1, 4}. If z({1, 3}) = v({1, 3}), and z({1, 5}) = v({1, 5}), then β3({1, 3}) ≥ 0, β3({1, 4}) = ε,
β3({1, 5}) ≥ ε, β3({1, 2}) ≥ ε and β3(N) = 0. Hence,
3ε ≤ β3({1, 3}) + β3({1, 4}) + β3({1, 5}) + β3({1, 2}) = 3β31 < 3β
3({1, 4}) = 3ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore z(R) > v(R) for exactly one coalition R ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}}.
Assume without loss of generality that z({1, 5}) > v({1, 5}) and therefore z({1, 3}) = v({1, 3}) (if
z({1, 3}) > v({1, 3}) then z({1, 5}) = v({1, 5}) and we consider S5 = {1, 4}). In this case, S3 = {1, 4}
and β3({1, 4}) = ε, β3({1, 3}) ≥ 0, β3({1, 2}) ≥ ε and β3(N) = 0. Note that β32 ≥ β
3
4 > 0. Therefore
z5 > v({5}) since β35 = −β
3({1, 2, 3, 4}) ≤ −β3({2, 4}) < 0.
Fix 0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)|R∩{1,5}|−|R∩{3,4}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R∩ {1, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}|, z(R) > v(R)} and define x˜ ∈ RN
as x˜j = zj− ε˜ for j ∈ {1, 5}, x˜2 = z2, and x˜j = zj+ ε˜ for j ∈ {3, 4}. By selection of ε˜, z1 > v({1}), z5 > v({5})
and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). It is easily seen that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with
x˜(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and |R ∩ {1, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}| by definition of x˜ and selection of ε˜. Note
that
z({2, 5})>v({2, 5}) since β3({2, 5})=−β3({1, 3, 4})≤−β34<0; (A.15)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 2, 5},{1, 4, 5},{1, 2, 4, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β33≤β
3
1<ε; (A.16)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)<0. (A.17)
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11) and by equations (A.15) to (A.17), it is easily seen that
x˜ ∈ Core(v), establishing a contradiction. Therefore S3 6= {1, 4}, which is in contradiction with (N, v) hav-
ing a stable core.
Subcase 2.2.2: ξ(C, 1) > ξ(C, 2).
Note that C = {{1, 2, i}, {1, 2, j}, {1, k}}with {i, j, k} = N \{1, 2} and therefore ξ(C, 1) = 2 and ξ(C, 2) = 1.
By equation (A.11) there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that zi > v({i}). We distinguish between two new subcases:
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z1 > v({1}) and z1 = v({1}).
Subcase 2.2.2.1: z1 > v({1}).
Fix 0 < ε ≤ min{z(R)−v(R) |R ∈ 2N , 1 ∈ R, z(R) > v(R)} and define x ∈ RN as x1 = z1−ε, x2 = z2+ε,
and xj = zj for j ∈ N \ {1, 2}. It readily follows that x ∈ I(v) \ Core(v) by selection of ε, z1 > v({1}), and
equation (A.12). Note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R), 1 ∈ R, and 2 6∈ R by
definition of x and selection of ε.
By stability of the core, there exist y ∈ Core(v) and S ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x(S) < v(S) such that y(S) = v(S)
and yj > xj for every j ∈ S. Define β ∈ RN as β = y − x. It readily follows that β(N) = 0, β(S) = ε, and
βj > 0 for every j ∈ S. Moreover 2β1+β2 ≥ ε since y ∈ Core(v) and therefore 2y1+y2 ≥ 2z1+z2 = 2x1+x2+ε,
where the inequality follows by equation (A.12) and the equality follows by definition of x. Besides it is easily
seen that, for R ∈ 2N \ {∅}, z(R) > v(R) in the following situations:
• 1, 2 ∈ R and β(R) < 0; • 1 ∈ R, 2 6∈ R, and β(R) < ε;
• 2 ∈ R, 1 6∈ R, and β(R) < −ε; • 1, 2 6∈ R and β(R) < 0.
It readily follows that S ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4, 5}}.
• Let S = {1, 3, 4, 5}, then β({1, 3, 4, 5}) = ε and βj > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5}. Since β(N) = 0,
it follows β2 = −ε establishing a contradiction with 2β1 + β2 ≥ ε. Therefore S 6= {1, 3, 4, 5} and S ∈
{{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}}.
• Let S = {1, 3, 4}, then β({1, 3, 4}) = ε and βj > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 3, 4}. Moreover, β({1, 2}) ≥ β({3, 4}) >
0 since 2β1 + β2 ≥ ε. It follows z5 > v({5}) since β5 = −β({1, 2, 3, 4}) < 0.
Fix 0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)|R∩{1,5}|−|R∩{2,3}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R∩ {1, 5}| > |R ∩ {2, 3}|, z(R) > v(R)} and define x˜ ∈ RN
as x˜j = zj− ε˜ for j ∈ {1, 5}, x˜j = zj+ ε˜ for j ∈ {2, 3}, and x˜4 = z4. By selection of ε˜, z1 > v({1}), z5 > v({5})
and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). It is easily seen that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with
x˜(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and |R ∩ {1, 5}| > |R ∩ {2, 3}| by definition of x˜ and selection of ε˜. Note
that
z({1, 4})>v({1, 4}) since β({1, 4})<β({1, 3, 4})=ε; (A.18)
z({4, 5})>v({4, 5}) since β({4, 5})=−β({1, 2, 3})<−β3<0; (A.19)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 2, 5},{1, 2, 4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)≤−β3<0; (A.20)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 5},{1, 3, 5},{1, 4, 5},{1, 3, 4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)≤−β2<β1<ε. (A.21)
By equations (A.18) to (A.21) it is easily seen that x˜ ∈ Core(v), establishing a contradiction. Hence S 6=
{1, 3, 4} and analogously S 6= {1, 3, 5} and S 6= {1, 4, 5}. Therefore S ∈ {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}}.
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• Let S = {1, 3}, then β({1, 3}) = ε, β1 > 0, and β3 > 0. Moreover, β({1, 2}) ≥ β3 > 0 since 2β1 + β2 ≥ ε.
If z({1, 4}) = v({1, 4}) and z({1, 5}) = v({1, 5}), then β({1, 3}) = ε, β({1, 4}) ≥ ε, β({1, 5}) ≥ ε,
β({1, 2}) > 0 and β(N) = 0. Hence,
3ε < β({1, 3}) + β({1, 4}) + β({1, 5}) + β({1, 2}) = 3β1 < 3β({1, 3}) = 3ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore z({1, 4}) > v({1, 4}) and/or z({1, 5}) > v({1, 5}). Assume without
loss of generality that z({1, 5}) > v({1, 5}).
If z({1, 4}) = v({1, 4}), then β({1, 3}) = ε, β({1, 4}) ≥ ε, 2β1+β2 ≥ ε and β(N) = 0. Hence, β({1, 2}) ≥
β3 > 0, β4 ≥ β3 > 0 and β5 = −β({1, 2, 3, 4}) < 0. Therefore, z5 > v({5}).
Fix 0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)2|R∩{5}|+|R∩{1}|−|R∩{2,3,4}| |R ∈ 2
N , 2|R∩{5}|+|R∩{1}| > |R∩{2, 3, 4}|, z(R) > v(R)}
and define x˜ ∈ RN as x˜1 = z1− ε˜, x˜j = zj+ ε˜ for j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and x˜5 = z5−2ε˜. By selection of ε˜, z1 > v({1}),
z5 > v({5}) and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with
x˜(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and 2|R ∩ {5}|+ |R ∩ {1}| > |R ∩ {2, 3, 4}| by definition of x˜ and selection
of ε˜. Note that
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{3, 5}, {4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)<−β({1, 2})<0; (A.22)
z({2, 5})>v({2, 5}) since β({2, 5})=−β({1, 3, 4})=−ε− β4<−ε; (A.23)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)≤−β2<β1<ε; (A.24)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)<0. (A.25)
By equations (A.22) to (A.25), it is easily seen that x˜ ∈ Core(v), establishing a contradiction. Therefore
z({1, 4}) > v({1, 4}).
Recall that β({1, 3}) = ε and β({1, 2}) ≥ β3 > 0 since 2β1+ β2 ≥ ε. Taking into account that β(N) = 0,
we have that
z({4, 5}) > v({4, 5}) since β({4, 5}) = −β({1, 2, 3}) < −β3 < 0. (A.26)
Therefore, β4 < 0 and/or β5 < 0. Assume without loss of generality that β5 < 0, then z5 > v({5}).
If β4 ≥ 0, fix 0 < ε¯ ≤ min{
z(R)−v(R)
|R∩{1,5}|−|R∩{2,3}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R∩{1, 5}| > |R∩{2, 3}|, z(R) > v(R)} and define
x¯ ∈ RN as x¯j = zj − ε¯ for j ∈ {1, 5}, x¯j = zj + ε¯ for j ∈ {2, 3}, and x¯4 = z4. By selection of ε¯, z1 > v({1}),
z5 > v({5}) and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x¯ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with
x¯(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and |R ∩ {1, 5}| > |R ∩ {2, 3}| by definition of x¯ and selection of ε¯. Note
that
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 4}, {1, 5}} by assumption; (A.27)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)≤−β3<0; (A.28)
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z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)≤−β2<β1<ε. (A.29)
By equations (A.26) to (A.29), it is easily seen that x¯ ∈ Core(v), establishing a contradiction. Therefore
β4 < 0 and z4 > v({4}). Note that
β4 > −β({1, 2, 3}) and β5 > −β({1, 2, 3})
since β({4, 5}) = −β({1, 2, 3}), β4 < 0, and β5 < 0.
Fix 0 < εˆ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)2|R∩{1}|+|R∩{4,5}|−2|R∩{2,3}| |R ∈ 2
N , 2|R ∩ {1}|+ |R ∩ {4, 5}| > 2|R ∩ {2, 3}|, z(R) >
v(R)} and define xˆ ∈ RN as xˆ1 = z1−2εˆ, xˆj = zj+2εˆ for j ∈ {2, 3}, and xˆj = zj−εˆ for j ∈ {4, 5}. By selection
of εˆ, z1 > v({1}), z4 > v({4}), z5 > v({5}) and equation (A.12), it readily follows that xˆ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v).
Note that
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)<−β2 + β({1, 2, 3})=β({1, 3})=ε; (A.30)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 4, 5}, {1, 3, 4, 5}} since β(R)=−β(N \R)≤−β2<β1<ε; (A.31)
z({1, 2, 4, 5})>v({1, 2, 4, 5}) since β({1, 2, 4, 5})=−β3<0. (A.32)
By equations (A.26), (A.27), and (A.30) to (A.32), it is easily seen that z(R) = v(R) for at least one coalition
R ∈ {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}} since xˆ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v).
By stability of the core, there exist yˆ ∈ Core(v) and Sˆ ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xˆ(Sˆ) < v(Sˆ) such that yˆ(Sˆ) = v(Sˆ)
and yˆj > xˆj for every j ∈ Sˆ. Define βˆ ∈ R
N as βˆ = yˆ − xˆ. It readily follows that βˆ(N) = 0, βˆ(Sˆ) = εˆ, and
βˆj > 0 for every j ∈ Sˆ.
Assume without loss of generality that Sˆ = {1, 2, 4}, then βˆ({1, 2, 4}) = εˆ and βˆ({1, 3}) ≥ 0. If
z({1, 2, 5}) = v({1, 2, 5}), then βˆ({1, 2, 5}) ≥ εˆ and
2εˆ ≤ βˆ({1, 2, 4}) + βˆ({1, 2, 5}) + βˆ({1, 3}) = 2βˆ1 + βˆ2 < 2βˆ({1, 2, 4}) = 2εˆ
establishing a contradiction. Therefore z({1, 2, 5}) > v({1, 2, 5}). Fix
0 < ε′ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)2|R∩{1,5}|+|R∩{4}|−3|R∩{2}|−2|R∩{3}| |R∈2
N , 2|R ∩ {1, 5}|+|R ∩ {4}|> 3|R ∩ {2}|+2|R ∩ {3}|,
z(R) > v(R)} and define x′ ∈ RN as x′j = zj − 2ε
′ for j ∈ {1, 5}, x′2 = z2 + 3ε
′, x′3 = z3 + 2ε
′, x′4 = z4 − ε
′.
By selection of ε′, z1 > v({1}), z4 > v({4}), z5 > v({5}) and equation (A.12), it readily follows that
x′ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Note that
z({1, 2, 5})>v({1, 2, 5}) by assumption; (A.33)
z({3, 4, 5})>v({3, 4, 5}) since β({3, 4, 5})=−β({1, 2})<0. (A.34)
By equations (A.26), (A.27), and (A.30) to (A.34), it is easily seen that x′ ∈ Core(v) establishing a contra-
diction.
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Therefore, if C ∈ MC(N) with E(C) = {i, j}, i 6= j, and ξ(C, i) > ξ(C, j), then for every z ∈
argminz˜∈Core(v)
{∑
S∈2N\{∅} ξ(C, i)z˜i
}
it must be zi = v({i}).
Subcase 2.2.2.2: z1 = v({1}).
By equation (A.11) we have that z2 > v({2}).
Fix 0 < ε ≤ min{z(R) − v(R) |R ∈ 2N , 2 ∈ R, z(R) > v(R)} and define, for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, xi ∈ RN
as xi2 = z2 − ε, x
i
i = zi + ε, and x
i
j = zj for j ∈ N \ {2, i}. For i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, it readily follows that
xi ∈ I(v) \ Core(v) by selection of ε, z2 > v({2}), and equation (A.12). For i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, note that if
R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R), 2 ∈ R, and i 6∈ R by definition of xi and selection of ε.
By stability of the core, for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, there exist yi ∈ Core(v) and Si ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(Si) < v(Si)
such that yi(Si) = v(Si) and yij > x
i
j for every j ∈ S
i. Define βi ∈ RN as βi = yi − xi. It readily follows
that βi(N) = 0, βi(Si) = ε, and βij > 0 for every j ∈ S
i. Moreover for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, 2βi1 + β
i
2 ≥ ε since
yi ∈ Core(v) and therefore 2yi1+y
i
2 ≥ 2z1+z2 = 2x
i
1+x
i
2+ε, where the inequality follows by equation (A.12)
and the equality follows by definition of xi. Besides it is easily seen that for i ∈ N \ {1, 2} and R ∈ 2N \ {∅},
z(R) > v(R) in the following situations:
• 2, i ∈ R and βi(R) < 0; • 2 ∈ R, i 6∈ R, and βi(R) < ε;
• i ∈ R, 2 6∈ R, and βi(R) < −ε; • 2, i 6∈ R and βi(R) < 0.
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11), it readily follows that S3 ∈ {{2, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5},
{2, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}}, S4 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 4},
{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
• Let S3 = {1, 2, 4, 5}, then β3({1, 2, 4, 5}) = ε, β3j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}, and β
3
3 = −ε. Note that
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β34<0; (A.35)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β35<0; (A.36)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)<−β33=ε. (A.37)
Equations (A.35) to (A.37) establish a contradiction with S4 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}, {2, 3, 5},
{1, 2, 3, 5}} and S5 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. Therefore S3 6= {1, 2, 4, 5} and
analogously S4 6= {1, 2, 3, 5} and S5 6= {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, S3 ∈ {{2, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {2, 4, 5}},
S4 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}, {2, 3, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}}.
• Let S3 = {2, 4, 5}, then β3({2, 4, 5}) = ε and β3j > 0 for every j ∈ {2, 4, 5}. Moreover, β
3
1 ≥
1
2β
3({4, 5}) > 0
since 2β31 + β
3
2 ≥ ε, and therefore β
3
3 = −β
3({1, 2, 4, 5}) = −ε− β31 < −ε. Note that
z(R)>v(R) for R ∈ {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)<−β34<0; (A.38)
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z({2, 3, 4})>v({2, 3, 4}) since β3({2, 3, 4})=−β3({1, 5})<0; (A.39)
z(R)>v(R) for R ∈ {{2, 4}, {2, 5}} since β3(R)<β3({2, 4, 5})=ε. (A.40)
By equations (A.38) to (A.40), it is easily seen that S4 = {1, 2, 5} and S5 = {1, 2, 4}. Then, z({1, 2, 4}) =
v({1, 2, 4}) and z({1, 2, 5}) = v({1, 2, 5}).
Recall that β33 = −ε− β
3
1 < −ε and therefore z3 > v({3}). Fix
0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)2|R∩{2}|+|R∩{3}|−|R∩{1,4,5}| |R ∈ 2
N , 2|R ∩ {2}|+ |R ∩ {3}| > |R ∩ {1, 4, 5}|, z(R) > v(R)} and
define x˜ ∈ RN as x˜j = zj + ε˜ for j ∈ {1, 4, 5}, x˜2 = z2 − 2ε˜, and x˜3 = z3 − ε˜. By selection of ε˜, z2 > v({2}),
and z3 > v({3}), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v). Note that
z({1, 2, 3, 4})>v({1, 2, 3, 4}) since β3({1, 2, 3, 4})=−β35<0; (A.41)
z({1, 2, 3, 5})>v({1, 2, 3, 5}) since β3({1, 2, 3, 5})=−β34<0; (A.42)
z({2, 3, 4, 5})>v({2, 3, 4, 5}) since β3({2, 3, 4, 5})=−β31<0. (A.43)
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11) and by equations (A.38) to (A.43), it is easily seen that x˜ ∈
Core(v) and therefore we are in the conditions of Subcase 2.2.2.1, which establishes a contradiction. Hence,
S3 6= {2, 4, 5} and analogously S4 6= {2, 3, 5} and S5 6= {2, 3, 4}. Then, S3 ∈ {{2, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}},
S4 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}.
• Let S3 = {1, 2, 4}, then β3({1, 2, 4}) = ε and β3j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 4}. Since β
3({2, 4}) < ε, we have
that
z({2, 4}) > v({2, 4}). (A.44)
If z({2, 5}) = v({2, 5}), then β3({1, 2, 4}) = ε, β3({2, 5}) ≥ ε, 2β31 + β
3
2 ≥ ε and β
3(N) = 0. Hence,
β35 ≥ β
3({1, 4}) > 0 and β33 = −β
3({1, 2, 4, 5}) < −ε. Therefore z3 > v({3}).
Fix 0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)|R∩{2,3}|−|R∩{4,5}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R∩ {2, 3}| > |R ∩ {4, 5}|, z(R) > v(R)} and define x˜ ∈ RN
as x˜1 = z1, x˜j = zj − ε˜ for j ∈ {2, 3}, x˜j = zj + ε˜ for j ∈ {4, 5}. By selection of ε˜, z2 > v({2}), z3 > v({3})
and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Note that,
z({1, 3})>v({1, 3}) since β3({1, 3})=−β3({2, 4, 5})≤−ε−β34<−ε; (A.45)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} since (A.46)
β3(R)=−β3(N \R)<0.
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11) and by equations (A.45) and (A.46), it is easily seen that
x˜ ∈ Core(v) which establishes a contradiction with x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Therefore, z({2, 5}) > v({2, 5}) and
S4 ∈ {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 3}}.
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If z({1, 2, 5}) = v({1, 2, 5}), then β3({1, 2, 4}) = ε, β3({1, 2, 5}) ≥ ε, 2β31 +β
3
2 ≥ ε and β
3(N) = 0. Hence,
β35 ≥ β
3
4 > 0 and β
3
3 = −β
3({1, 2, 4, 5}) < −ε. Therefore z3 > v({3}).
Fix 0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)2|R∩{2}|+|R∩{3}|−|R∩{1,4,5}| |R ∈ 2
N , 2|R∩{2}|+|R∩{3}| > |R∩{1, 4, 5}|, z(R) > v(R)}
and define x˜ ∈ RN as x˜j = zj+ ε˜ for j ∈ {1, 4, 5}, x˜2 = z2−2ε˜, and x˜3 = z3− ε˜. By selection of ε˜, z2 > v({2}),
and z3 > v({3}), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v). If x˜ ∈ Core(v), then we are in the conditions of Subcase
2.2.2.1, which establishes a contradiction. Therefore x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with
x˜(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and 2|R ∩ {2}|+ |R ∩ {3}| > |R ∩ {1, 4, 5}| by definition of x˜ and selection
of ε˜. Note that
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 4, 5}} since (A.47)
β3(R)=−β3(N \R)<0.
Since x˜ ∈ I(v) \Core(v), z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11), and by equations (A.44) and (A.47), it is
easily seen that z({2, 5}) = v({2, 5}). However, we have already seen that z({2, 5}) > v({2, 5}) establishing
a contradiction with x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Therefore, z({1, 2, 5}) > v({1, 2, 5}) and S4 ∈ {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
If z({2, 3}) = v({2, 3}), then β3({1, 2, 4}) = ε, β3({2, 3}) ≥ 0, 2β31 + β
3
2 ≥ ε and β
3(N) = 0. Hence
z5 > v({5}) since β35 = −β
3({1, 2, 3, 4}) ≤ −β3({1, 4}) < 0. Fix
0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)|R∩{2,5}|−|R∩{3,4}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R ∩ {2, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}|, z(R) > v(R)} and define x˜ ∈ RN as
x˜1 = z1, x˜j = zj − ε˜ for j ∈ {2, 5}, and x˜j = zj + ε˜ for j ∈ {3, 4}. By selection of ε˜, z2 > v({2}), z5 > v({5})
and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \Core(v). Note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x˜(R) < v(R),
then z(R) = v(R) and |R ∩ {2, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}| by definition of x˜ and selection of ε˜. Moreover,
z({1, 5})>v({1, 5}) since β3({1, 5})=−β3({2, 3, 4}≤−β34<0; (A.48)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, } since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β34<0; (A.49)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β33≤β
3
2<ε. (A.50)
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11) and by equations (A.48) to (A.50), it is easily seen that
x˜ ∈ Core(v), which establishes a contradiction with x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Therefore z({2, 3}) > v({2, 3}) and
S4 = {1, 2, 3}. Then, z({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}) and β3({1, 2, 4}) = ε, β3({1, 2, 3}) ≥ 0, 2β31 + β
3
2 ≥ ε and
β3(N) = 0. Hence z5 > v({5}) since β35 = −β
3({1, 2, 3, 4}) ≤ −β34 < 0. Fix
0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)|R∩{2,5}|−|R∩{3,4}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R ∩ {2, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}|, z(R) > v(R)} and define x˜ ∈ RN as
x˜1 = z1, x˜j = zj − ε˜ for j ∈ {2, 5}, and x˜j = zj + ε˜ for j ∈ {3, 4}. By selection of ε˜, z2 > v({2}), z5 > v({5})
and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \Core(v). Note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x˜(R) < v(R),
then z(R) = v(R) and |R ∩ {2, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}| by definition of x˜ and selection of ε˜. Moreover,
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, } since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β34<0; (A.51)
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z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}} since (A.52)
β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β33≤β
3({1, 2})<ε.
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11) and by equations (A.51) and (A.52), together with x˜ ∈
I(v) \Core(v), it readily follows that z({1, 5}) = v({1, 5}). Fix
0 < ε¯ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)2|R∩{2}|+|R∩{5}|−|R∩{1,3,4}| |R ∈ 2
N , 2|R ∩ {2}| + |R ∩ {5}| > |R ∩ {1, 3, 4}|, z(R) > v(R)}
and define x¯ ∈ RN as x¯j = zj + ε¯ for j ∈ {1, 3, 4}, x¯2 = z2 − 2ε¯, and x¯5 = z5 − ε¯. By selection of ε¯,
z2 > v({2}), and z5 > v({5}), it readily follows that x¯ ∈ I(v). If x¯ ∈ Core(v), we are in the conditions of
Subcase 2.2.2.1, establishing a contradiction. Therefore, x¯ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Since z({1, 5}) = v({1, 5}) we
have that β3({1, 5}) ≥ 0. Recall that β3({1, 2, 4}) = ε and β3({1, 2, 3}) ≥ 0. Then,
z({2, 3})>v({2, 3}) since β3({2, 3})=−β3({1, 4, 5})≤−β34<0; (A.53)
z({2, 3, 4, 5})>v({2, 3, 4, 5}) since β3({2, 3, 4, 5})=−β31<0. (A.54)
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11) and by equations (A.44) and (A.51) to (A.54), it is easily seen
that x¯ ∈ Core(v) which establishes a contradiction with x¯ ∈ I(v) \Core(v). Hence, z({1, 2, 3}) > v({1, 2, 3})
establishing a contradiction with S4 = {1, 2, 3}. Therefore, S3 6= {1, 2, 4} and analogously S3 6= {1, 2, 5},
S4 6∈ {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}, and S5 6∈ {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}}. Then, S3 ∈ {{2, 4}, {2, 5}}, S4 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 5}},
and S5 ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 4}}.
• Let S3 = {2, 4}, then β3({2, 4}) = ε and β3j > 0 for every j ∈ {2, 4}. Moreover, 2β
3
1 + β
3
2 ≥ ε. Hence,
β31 ≥
1
2β
3
4 > 0.
If z({2, 3}) = v({2, 3}) and z({2, 5}) = v({2, 5}), then β3({2, 3}) ≥ 0 and β3({2, 5}) ≥ ε. Since β31 > 0,
β3({2, 4}) = ε, and β3(N) = 0, we have that
2ε < β31 + β
3({2, 3}) + β3({2, 4}) + β3({2, 5}) = 2β32 < 2β
3({2, 4}) = 2ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore z(R) > v(R) for exactly one coalition R ∈ {{2, 3}, {2, 5}}.
Assume without loss of generality that z({2, 5}) > v({2, 5}), then z({2, 3}) = v({2, 3}) and β3({2, 3}) ≥ 0.
Since β31 > 0 and β
3(N) = 0 we have that β35 = −β
3({1, 2, 3, 4}) ≤ −β3({1, 4}) < 0 and therefore z5 > v({5}).
Fix 0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)|R∩{2,5}|−|R∩{3,4}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R∩ {2, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}|, z(R) > v(R)} and define x˜ ∈ RN
as x˜1 = z1, x˜j = zj − ε˜ for j ∈ {2, 5}, and x˜j = zj + ε˜ for j ∈ {3, 4}. By selection of ε˜, z2 > v({2}),
z5 > v({5}) and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with
x˜(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and |R ∩ {2, 5}| > |R ∩ {3, 4}| by definition of x˜ and selection of ε˜. Recall
that β3({2, 4}) = ε, β3({2, 3}) ≥ 0 and β31 > 0. Then,
z({1, 5})>v({1, 5}) since β3({1, 5})=−β3({2, 3, 4})≤−β34<0; (A.55)
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z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β34<0; (A.56)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 2, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β33≤β
3
2<ε. (A.57)
Since z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) by equation (A.11) and by equations (A.55) to (A.57), it is easily seen that
x˜ ∈ Core(v) which establishes a contradiction with x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Therefore S3 6= {2, 4}, which is in
contradiction with (N, v) having a stable core.
As a result, if (N, v) does not have a large core, then there must be a minimal cover C with |E(C)| > 2
that does not satisfy the minimal cover inequality.
Case 3: |E(C)| = 3.
Assume without loss of generality that E(C) = {1, 2, 3}. Note that C = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} and therefore
ξ(C, 1) = ξ(C, 2) = ξ(C, 3) = 1. By equation (A.11) we have that
z({1, 2, 3}) > max{ v({1}) + v({2}) + v({3}), v({1}) + v({2, 3}), v({2}) + v({1, 3}),
v({3}) + v({1, 2}), 12 (v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({2, 3})), v({1, 2, 3})}.
(A.58)
Therefore, there exists at least one player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} with zi > v({i}) and players j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} with j 6= k
such that z({j, k}) > v({j, k}). Moreover,
z({1, 2, 3}) > v({1, 2, 3}). (A.59)
Let {1, 2, 3} = {i, j, k}, we distinguish between two subcases: z({i, j}) = v({i, j}), z({i, k}) = v({i, k}), and
z({j, k}) > v({j, k}); z({i, j}) ≥ v({i, j}), z({i, k}) > v({i, k}), and z({j, k}) > v({j, k}).
Subcase 3.1: z({i, j}) = v({i, j}), z({i, k}) = v({i, k}), and z({j, k}) > v({j, k}).
Assume without loss of generality that z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) and therefore z({1, 3}) = v({1, 3}) and z({2, 3}) =
v({2, 3}). By equation (A.58) we have that z1 > v({1}) and z2 > v({2}). Fix
0 < ε ≤ mini∈{4,5}{min{
z(R)−v(R)
|R∩{1,2}|−|R∩{3,i}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R∩ {1, 2}| > |R∩ {3, i}|, z(R) > v(R)}} and define, for
i ∈ {4, 5}, xi ∈ RN as xij = zj − ε for j ∈ {1, 2}, x
i
j = zj + ε for j ∈ {3, i}, and x
i
j = zj for j ∈ {4, 5} \ {i}.
For i ∈ {4, 5}, it readily follows that xi ∈ I(v) \ Core(v) by selection of ε, z1 > v({1}), z2 > v({2}) and
equation (A.12). For i ∈ {4, 5}, note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and
|R ∩ {1, 2}| > |R ∩ {3, i}| by definition of xi and selection of ε.
By stability of the core, there exist yi ∈ Core(v) and Si ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(Si) < v(Si) such that
yi(Si) = v(Si) and yij > x
i
j for every j ∈ S
i. Define βi ∈ RN as βi = yi−xi. It readily follows that βi(N) = 0,
βi(Si) = ε, and βij > 0 for every j ∈ S
i. Moreover for i ∈ N \ {1, 2}, βi({1, 2, 3}) ≥ ε since yi ∈ Core(v)
and therefore yi({1, 2, 3}) ≥ z({1, 2, 3}) = xi({1, 2, 3}) + ε, where the inequality follows by equation (A.12)
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and the equality follows by definition of xi. Since z({1, 3}) = v({1, 3}) and z({2, 3}) = v({2, 3}), we also
have that βi({1, 3}) ≥ 0 and βi({2, 3}) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {4, 5}. Besides it is easily seen that for i ∈ {4, 5} and
R ∈ 2N \ {∅}, z(R) > v(R) in the following situations:
• |R ∩ {1, 2}| = |R ∩ {3, i}| and βi(R) < 0; • |R ∩ {1, 2}| = |R ∩ {3, i}|+ 1 and βi(R) < ε;
• |R ∩ {1, 2}| = |R ∩ {3, i}| − 2 and βi(R) < −2ε; • |R ∩ {1, 2}| = |R ∩ {3, i}|+ 2 and βi(R) < 2ε.
• |R ∩ {1, 2}| = |R ∩ {3, i}| − 1 and βi(R) < −ε;
It readily follows that S4 ∈ {{1, 5}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}} and S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {2, 4},
{1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 4, 5}}.
• Let S4 = {1, 2, 4, 5}, then β4({1, 2, 4, 5}) = ε and β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}. Recall that β
4({1, 3}) ≥ 0,
and β4(N) = 0. Hence,
ε ≤ β4({1, 2, 4, 5}) + β4({1, 3}) = β41 < β
4({1, 2, 4, 5}) = ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore S4 6= {1, 2, 4, 5} and analogously S5 6= {1, 2, 4, 5}. Then, S4 ∈
{{1, 5}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} and S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
• Let S4 = {1, 2, 3, 5}, then β4({1, 2, 3, 5}) = ε and β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5}. Recall that β
4({1, 2, 3}) ≥
ε. Hence
ε ≤ β4({1, 2, 3}) < β4({1, 2, 3, 5}) = ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore S4 6= {1, 2, 3, 5} and analogously S5 6= {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, S4 ∈
{{1, 5}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}}.
• Let S4 = {1, 2, 4}, then β4({1, 2, 4}) = ε and β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 4}. Recall that β
4({1, 3}) ≥ 0,
β4({2, 3}) ≥ 0, β4({1, 2, 3}) ≥ ε and β4(N) = 0. Hence, it is easily seen that β43 ≥ β
4
4 > 0 and β
4
5 =
−β4({1, 2, 3, 4}) < 0. Therefore z5 > v({5}).
Fix 0 < ε˜ ≤ min{ z(R)−v(R)|R∩{1,2,5}|−|R∩{3}|−2|R∩{4}| |R ∈ 2
N , |R∩{1, 2, 5}| > |R∩{3}|+2|R∩{4}|, z(R)> v(R)}
and define x˜ ∈ RN as x˜j = zj − ε˜ for j ∈ {1, 2, 5}, x˜3 = z3 + ε˜, and x˜4 = z4 + 2ε˜. By selection of ε˜,
z1 > v({1}), z2 > v({2}), z5 > v({5}) and equation (A.12), it readily follows that x˜ ∈ I(v) \ Core(v). Note
that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with x˜(R) < v(R), then z(R) = v(R) and |R ∩ {1, 2, 5}| > |R ∩ {3}| + 2|R ∩ {4}| by
definition of x˜ and selection of ε˜. Note that,
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 5}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} since β4(R)=−β4(N \R)≤−β44<0<ε; (A.60)
z({1, 2, 5})>v({1, 2, 5}) since β4({1, 2, 5})=−β4({3, 4})<0<2ε; (A.61)
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 5}} since β4(R)=−β4(N \R)<−β44<0; (A.62)
z({1, 2, 4, 5})>v({1, 2, 4, 5}) since β4({1, 2, 4, 5})=−β43<0<ε. (A.63)
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By equations (A.59) to (A.63), it is easily seen that x˜ ∈ Core(v) which establishes a contradiction with x˜ ∈
I(v) \ Core(v). Therefore S4 6= {1, 2, 4} and analogously S5 6= {1, 2, 5}. Then, S4 ∈ {{1, 5}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 5}}
and S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 4}}.
• Let S4 = {1, 2, 5}, then β4({1, 2, 5}) = 2ε and β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 5}. Recall that β
4({1, 3}) ≥ 0,
β4({2, 3}) ≥ 0, β4({1, 2, 3}) ≥ ε and β4(N) = 0. Note that,
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 4}, {2, 4}} since β4(R)=−β4(N \R)≤−β45<0<ε; (A.64)
z({1, 2, 4})>v({1, 2, 4}) since β4({1, 2, 4})=−β4({3, 5})<−β43≤β
4({1, 2})− ε<2ε− ε=ε. (A.65)
Equations (A.64) and (A.65) establish a contradiction with S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {2, 4}, {1, 2, 4}}. Therefore S4 6=
{1, 2, 5} and analogously S5 6= {1, 2, 4}. Then, S4 ∈ {{1, 5}, {2, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {2, 4}}.
• Let S4 = {1, 5}, then β4({1, 5}) = ε and β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 5}. Recall that β
4({1, 3}) ≥ 0,
β4({2, 3}) ≥ 0, β4({1, 2, 3}) ≥ ε and β4(N) = 0. Note that
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 4}, {2, 4}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)≤−β45<0<ε. (A.66)
Equation (A.66) establishes a contradiction with S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {2, 4}}. Therefore S4 6= {1, 5} and analogously
S4 6= {2, 5}. This establishes a contradiction with (N, v) being stable.
Subcase 3.2: z({i, j}) ≥ v({i, j}), z({i, k}) > v({i, k}), and z({j, k}) > v({j, k}).
Assume without loss of generality that z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}), z({1, 3}) > v({1, 3}), and z({2, 3}) ≥ v({2, 3}).
If z({2, 3}) = v({2, 3}), then we have that z1 > v({1}) by equation (A.58). If z({2, 3}) > v({2, 3}), then we
can assume without loss of generality that z1 > v({1}) by equation (A.58). Fix
0 < ε ≤ min{z(R)− v(R) |R ∈ 2N , 1 ∈ R, z(R) > v(R)} and define, for i ∈ {4, 5}, xi ∈ RN as xi1 = z1 − ε,
xii = zi + ε, and x
i
j = zj for j ∈ N \ {1, i}. For i ∈ {4, 5}, it readily follows that x
i ∈ I(v) \ Core(v) by
selection of ε, z1 > v({1}), and equation (A.12). For i ∈ {4, 5}, note that if R ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(R) < v(R),
then z(R) = v(R), 1 ∈ R and i 6∈ R by definition of xi and selection of ε.
By stability of the core, there exist yi ∈ Core(v) and Si ∈ 2N \ {∅} with xi(Si) < v(Si) such that
yi(Si) = v(Si) and yij > x
i
j for every j ∈ S
i. Define βi ∈ RN as βi = yi − xi. It readily follows that
βi(N) = 0, βi(Si) = ε, and βij > 0 for every j ∈ S
i. Moreover for i ∈ {4, 5}, βi({1, 2, 3}) ≥ ε since
yi ∈ Core(v) and therefore yi({1, 2, 3}) ≥ z({1, 2, 3}) = xi({1, 2, 3}) + ε, where the inequality follows by
equation (A.12) and the equality follows by definition of xi. Besides it is easily seen that for i ∈ {4, 5} and
R ∈ 2N \ {∅}, z(R) > v(R) in the following situations:
• 1, i ∈ R and βi(R) < 0; • 1 ∈ R, i 6∈ R, and βi(R) < ε;
• i ∈ R, 1 6∈ R, and βi(R) < −ε; • 1, i 6∈ R and βi(R) < 0.
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It readily follows by equation (A.59) and the assumption z({1, 2}) > v({1, 2}) and z({1, 3}) > v({1, 3}) that
S4 ∈ {{1, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}} and S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}.
• Let S4 = {1, 2, 3, 5}, then β4({1, 2, 3, 5}) = ε and β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5}. Recall that β
4({1, 2, 3}) ≥
ε. Hence,
ε ≤ β4({1, 2, 3}) < β4({1, 2, 3, 5}) = ε
establishing a contradiction. Therefore S4 6= {1, 2, 3, 5} and analogously S5 6= {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then, S4 ∈
{{1, 5}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}}, and S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}.
• Let S4 = {1, 3, 5}, then β4({1, 3, 5}) = ε and β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 3, 5}. Recall that β
4({1, 2, 3}) ≥ ε
and therefore β42 ≥ β
4
5 > 0. Note that,
z(R)>v(R) for R∈{{1, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}} since β3(R)=−β3(N \R)<0<ε. (A.67)
Equation (A.67) establishes a contradiction with S5 ∈ {{1, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}. Therefore S4 6= {1, 3, 5}
and analogously S4 6= {1, 2, 5} and S5 6∈ {{1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}. Therefore S4 = {1, 5} and S5 = {1, 4}.
• Hence, S4 = {1, 5} and β4({1, 5}) = ε with β4j > 0 for every j ∈ {1, 5}. Moreover, z({1, 4}) = v({1, 4})
since S5 = {1, 4} and then β4({1, 4}) ≥ 0. Recall that β4({1, 2, 3}) ≥ ε and β4(N) = 0. Hence,
2ε ≤ β4({1, 5}) + β4({1, 4}) + β4({1, 2, 3}) = 2β41 < 2β
4({1, 5}) = 2ε
establishing a contradiction. This establishes a contradiction with (N, v) being stable.
As a result, if (N, v) does not have a large core, then there must be a minimal cover C with |E(C)| > 3
that does not satisfy the minimal cover inequality. However, |E(C)| ≤ 3 for every minimal cover C since
|N | = 5. Consequently, we show that stability of the core implies largeness of the core for |N | = 5. 2
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